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~INTRODUCTION~

To Be, or Not to Be, the Bridge:
“Postfeminism,” catching the wave, and Re-imagining Feminism

“The dream is real, my friends.
The failure to realize it is the only unreality.”
–from The Salt Eaters
by Toni Cade Bambara1

In her preface to This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of Color,
Cherrie Moraga wrote that her book, her message, “is about physical and psychic struggle.
It is about intimacy, a desire for life between all of us, not settling for less than freedom
even in the most private aspects of our lives. A total vision.”2 This total vision is what I
endeavor to take up in this work, and what has been my inspiration and motivation. For I
can no longer disregard the fact that Feminism—with a capital “F,” feminism proper as
recorded and documented in official (read: Western) history—does not function for me,
just as it didn’t function for Moraga, or Audre Lorde, or Barbara Smith, or any of the
contributors to This Bridge. Its malfunction stems from its shortsightedness, its failure to
develop that total vision, as made manifest by the perpetuation of ethnocentrism,
Eurocentrism, racism, classism, heterosexism. As made manifest by the way Feminism
fails to see beyond its own very Western scope, fails to envision ways to unite across
cultures and oceans and borders that are not reductive, assimilating, or imperialist.
This historical myopia is not the fault of feminists as a whole, many of whom
have dared to envision and revolutionize feminist praxis in radical ways, always and in
every way imaginable. Rather, it is the fault of the way certain feminists—Euro-
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American feminists with race and class power, with dangerous
liberal/reformist/imperialist politics, and who therefore get patriarchal approval and
power to assimilate or define the language of Feminism—have for the past century and a
half historicized feminism. They have written the history of Feminism, the master
narrative, which is relegated to the status of Fact and which is therefore digested and
emulated as Fact in every consecutive generation of feminists.
This problematic historicization cannot continue any longer.
This Feminism cannot function for me, or for millions of other individuals
worldwide who need to a language to fight sexism as well as racism, ableism, imperialism,
capitalism, neocolonialism, homophobia. Yet I am not ready to give up on feminism—
feminism in a non-hegemonic sense, in a way open for interpretation and multiple
languages, definitions, agendas, and liberationist praxis. I rather want to re-vision it, as
it should be: as it has been all along, in radical, peripheral spaces that have resisted
colonization by Western, racist, patriarchal thought. As it has existed in cultures across
the world, for time immemorial, beyond the minimizing scope of ruling-class reformist
feminists in Europe and the Unites States.
In the same Preface, Moraga also wrote, “Change does not occur in a vacuum.”3
Indeed not: it requires the creation of a culture of consciousness, it requires faith, and it
requires the out-of-bounds research that endeavors to re-historicize the trajectory of
feminist past in a way that frees space for enhanced possibility, for genuine liberty, for the
institution of that total vision. This is why I write this work now: because change is
needed now, today, as a new “wave” of American feminism comes of age, determines the
future of feminism, defines its praxis, and writes its history. For this to be accomplished
in a way that is not disastrous, feminism must first be rehistoricized.
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Today, a new chapter is being appended to the history of United States
social justice movement. Since the early 1990s, the so-called “Generation X”—the
generation born in America between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, the
children of the Baby Boomers, and the first generation to grow up in the
aftermath of the Civil Rights, Black Power, and Women’s Liberation era—has
been coming of age. Against wide spread charges of being apathetic and
depoliticized, is struggling to define a politics, praxis, and social movement of its
own. Weaned on the advantages provided by 1960s and 1970s leftist movements
and seldom witnessing the same extent of legislatively sanctioned discrimination
experienced by their elders, yet raised with the conservative, consumerist, and
individualist ethos of the Reagan-Bush administrations, young adults today have
created a praxis that, as many scholars and writers have pointed out, is a unique
combination of individualism and dedication to equal rights and “diversity”
(however superficial) that is specific to this historical moment. Even though
genuine equality has not been achieved by any means, the legislative and
sociocultural reforms made by their parents’ generation typically cause this
generation to recognize their right to unqualified equality as a birthright.
Today’s social movements frequently lack the ability to engage in
national/broad-based movement; yet, on a local scale, these movements—
feminist, environmentalist, hip-hop/anti-racist, queer/LGBTQ4—are undeniably
alive. Youth and young adults are organizing around peace initiatives,
environmental conservation and justice and animals’ rights; around healthcare,
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fair housing, and economic justice/welfare rights; around police brutality, street
violence, prisoners’ rights and prison reform; around queer rights, trans and
intersex rights, equal marriage laws, and anti-hate agendas; and around
reproductive rights, victims’ rights, sexual freedom, workplace discrimination,
and global human rights. Sometimes there are no clear divisions between these
agendas: activists identify and engage with and through a combination of these
issues.
Amidst this social justice organizing, there is a new generation of
feminism that, since the mid-nineties, has become increasingly vocal, active and
prolific, and envisions itself continuing the feminist work of the 1960s-1970s
Women’s Liberation movement, an era known as the “second wave” of feminism.
Having christened themselves “the third wave,” these young women and men
simultaneously claim continuity with previous American/Western feminist
legacies yet intentionally construct a distance or disconnect from previous
generations by allegedly representing progress or ideological evolution.5 Indeed,
much of this feminist generation endeavors to centrally locate and organize
around race and sexuality in addition to gender, and is inclined to generate
vitriolic critique of racism and classism in earlier feminist movement. Inhabiting
the interstices of postmodernism, poststructuralism, black and woman of color or
U.S. third world feminism,6 pro-sex feminism, Marxist/working class feminism,
queer feminism, as well as “equity” or traditional/reformist feminism, a
principal goal of the mainstream “third wave” is “the development of modes of
thinking that can come to terms with the multiple, constantly shifting bases of
oppression in relation to the multiple, interpenetrating axes of identity, and the
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creation of a coalition politics based on these understandings.”7 The primary
characteristic of this self-declared “third wave,” then, is an awareness and
appreciation of the many contradictions and ambiguities that exist in real life—or,
that is, “what looks likes contradiction, if one doesn’t shift one’s point of view.”8
As great and as revolutionary as this sounds, however, the construction
of this “new” feminism as the “third wave,” I argue, is problematic to the extent
that its most central politics are compromised. By examining the “rebirth” of
feminism in the early 1990s as well as its development, goals, activism, and
central tenets, it becomes clear that this third wave construction exposes twentyfirst century feminist movement to multiple conflicts, reductions, and erasures
that have not yet been sufficiently acknowledged, and which are antithetical to
its most essential goals and agendas. In order to create a viable social justice
movement for young women and men today, feminism must be re-imagined and
rehistoricized.

Changing Tides: Backlash and “Postfeminism”

The “birth” of the supposed “third wave” of feminism in the early to mid
nineties in many ways signaled the end of a twelve year period of national
political conservatism across the United States, under the consecutive Reagan
and Bush administrations. As multiple scholars and journalists have explained,
most notably Susan Faludi in her 1991 Backlash : The Undeclared War Against
Women, the decadent eighties had been a time of wide scale backlash against the
feminist movement of the late 1960s and 70s, a time which—according to the
media—heralded the rise of “postfeminism” in the late 80s and early 90s:
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whether because the Women’s Liberation movement had been a success and
equality was already achieved, or because the crazy women’s libbers of the leftist
years had caused women to be unhappy, women allegedly no longer needed
feminism. According to feminist scholar and writer Deborah Siegel,
postfeminism was the (false) ideology that “describes a moment when women’s
movements are, for whatever reason, no longer moving, no longer vital, no
longer relevant; the term suggests that the gains forged by previous generations
of women have so completely pervaded all tiers of our social existence that those
still ‘harping’ about women’s victim status are embarrassingly out of touch.”9 In
ManifestA, Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards cite a 1990 Newsweek story
by Kay Ebeling, “The Failure of Feminism,” which was one of many accounts
that charged feminism with having hurt women: supposedly, “the women who
had bought feminism’s lie were overworked, underpaid, and doomed to
loneliness” while women’s assumption of an economic role “liberated” men from
their financial responsibilities to their family.10 Moreover, according to feminist
writer/activist Sheila Radford-Hill, the “postfeminist” situation was exacerbated
by the fact that “controversy [had] turned feminism inward”: failing to
appropriately negotiate issues of race, class, power, and privilege, and stymied
by “divisive sectarian debates,” feminism withdrew from public activism.11
Hence, as a consequence of these different social trends, if one read the papers,
watched the news, or read the best-selling literature of the era, one would have
heard a cacophony of voices proclaiming that feminism was dead.
This rejection of feminism, however, was not new to the eighties-nineties
“postfeminist” era: the same phenomenon occurred following the alleged decline
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of feminism in the 1920s and 1930s, following the ratification of the Nineteenth
Amendment which signified the end of the 75-year struggle for women’s
suffrage—a period commonly known as the “first wave” of feminism. Yet, as
scholar Astrid Henry explains, feminism didn’t actually die: rather women
turned their attention to other social justice efforts and endeavors, many of
which still related to women’s rights. 12 Likewise many feminist historians
dispute the idea that feminism died in the 1980s, following the supposed end of
the “second wave.”
Indeed, the feminists who had been active in the 1960s and 1970s did not
simply disappeared into the woodwork once President Ronald Reagan was
inaugurated for his first term, nor had they suddenly renounced their feminist
politics. Rather, many of them had disappeared into the ivory towers of academe:
for many feminists in the United States, the 80s and 90s were an era
characterized by the academization of U.S. feminism, which to some extent
included the discourses of black and U.S. third world feminism for the first
time.13 While their inclusion was by no means equal within the predominantly
racist hegemonic discourse of white academic feminism, and while “inclusion”
frequently implied assimilation or co-optation as opposed to equal representation,
this era saw a far greater degree of inclusion than previously experienced. As
Radford-Hill notes, “[a]s feminism gained intellectual legitimacy, [many]
feminists understandably became more concerned with their relationship to the
intellectual establishment.”14,15
Moreover, another indicator that feminism did not die in the 1980s is the
fact that the stellar literature of some of the most profoundly insightful feminist
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theorists American feminism has ever known, such as Audre Lorde, bell hooks,
Barbara Smith, Cherri Moraga, and Gloria Anzaldua, was produced in the late
seventies and early to mid eighties. Many of these women did not enter academia
in these years, in fact resisting the intellectual establishment and continuing to
engage in grassroots politicizing and theorizing. Identifying themselves as black
feminists, woman of color feminists, or U.S. third world feminists, these were
black, brown, Latina, Chicana, Native American, and Asian American women
who fiercely, passionately, and persuasively challenged privileged white
feminists, who had dominated the movement in the 60s and 70s, to recognize
and confront their internalized racism and classism. Of course, black and brown
women had been active in and instrumental to United States feminist movement
from its inception, and individual women such as Angela Davis and groups like
the Combahee River Collective had long been challenging racism and classism
within Leftist social justice movements, but a substantial amount of the most
revolutionary anti-racist feminist theory was generated in the years that,
according to popular knowledge, was characterized by the “death” or
obsolescence of feminism. Clearly, this fact indicates the continued
marginalization of feminists who were not born into or who refused to collude
with white privilege, a marginalization which caused black, U.S. third world,
and other alternative feminist conceptualizations to be peripheral to mainstream
feminist historicizing.16
Mainstream feminism’s move off the streets, onto campus, and into the
classroom effectively made feminism seem either absent or at least irrelevant to
the daily lives of many black, brown, lesbian, and/or working women. To
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middle class white women, meanwhile, feminism seemed like a ghost of the past:
even if equality was not achieved, women—that is, heterosexual middle class
white women—had a substantive slew of new rights including access to abortion,
equal pay for equal work, protection against harassment in the workplace, and,
therefore, the means (at least in theory) to be financially independent. They had,
in other words, gained equality with the men in their class, and met their
primary interests, a la “if you can’t beat the patriarchy, join the patriarchy.” And
ostensibly, some of these women had even grown tired of their new-found
liberty: Radford-Hill notes that “At the height of the backlash, most feminists
became synonymous with women who, after fighting to gain access to the labor
market, became bored at work and concerned about their ‘biological clocks’ and
were therefore exercising their self-absorbed right to go home and have babies
because they were tired of ‘having it all.’”17 Whether or not this was actually true
of feminist women, it was the notion peddled by much press coverage.
Simultaneously, to the conservative men and women who had harbored
animosity toward women’s liberation, the arrival of a right-wing, moralist and
individualist Republican in the oval office created a perfect climate for backlash
against women who had forgotten their rightful, “natural” place: looking sexy
and happily being sheltered in the “simple” life of domesticity. Thus, an age of
“postfeminism” was declared.
However, as the backlash intensified and feminist-inspired legislation
became increasingly threatened by conservative anti-feminist political agendas,
liberal feminist women who wanted to preserve their piece of the capitalist pie
sprang into action once more.18 Simultaneously, as Astrid Henry notes, feminists
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were coalesced into action in response to the highly publicized—indeed
televised—sexual harassment scandal between Clarence Thomas and Anita Hill in
1991, and feminism recaptured the American public’s attention via portrayals of
liberated/pro-feminist women in popular culture. While television audiences
tuned into hit sitcoms like Rosanne and Murphy Brown starting in 1988,
moviegoers saw—and liked—images of brave, women-identified women Thelma
and Louise in 1991.19 The stage was set for another transition into popular
feminism, a new era that would be heralded as the “third wave” of American
feminism.

Congratulations, It’s a Wave:
Power feminism and the rise of the New Third Wave

The first feminists to come onto the scene in the early 1990s were
conservative feminists of the capitalist persuasion—privileged, ivy-league
educated white women like Katie Roiphe, Rene Denfeld, Camille Paglia, and
Naomi Wolf, whose politics revealed their privileged status and who seemed
largely ignorant of the fact that women do not constitute a monolithic group
across realities of race and class. As multiple critics and writers including bell
hooks, Henry, Baumgardner and Richards, Siegel, Carolyn Sorisio and others
have noted, these women were regressing to white, privileged class reformist
feminism: they claimed feminism in that they advocated women’s sexual and
economic equality, yet they tended to embrace Reagan-inspired individualism
and rejected their “second wave” foremothers whose feminism they saw as
excessively moralist, restrictive, anti-sex, and anti-pleasure. As Siegel and Henry
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each remark upon, these feminists desired to “reclaim” feminism, to replace the
“bad” feminism of old with a “good,” “new” feminism20: one that was fun and
sexy, that used women’s empowerment to beat capitalism at its own game (i.e.,
use the system to beat the system, before it can beat you), that embraced sexuality
and emphasized women’s pleasure—and in the process ignored women’s issues
that did not apply to their specific social status.
This feminism was alternately called “capitalist feminism,” “Do-Me
feminism,” and—most popularly—“power feminism,” a term coined by Naomi
Wolf in her 1994 book Fire With Fire. The term “power feminism” was created in
contrast to what these writers saw as a focus on “victim feminism” in previous
movements. That is, whereas they saw mainstream feminists as prude and
preoccupied with women’s victimization at the hand of men, especially in terms
of the rape crisis movement which Denfeld and Roiphe considered excessive and
neo-Victorian, these feminists wanted a movement that emphasized women’s
empowerment in all areas of their lives: from unabashed, pleasure-seeking sex
with masculine men to careening through the glass ceiling and becoming one of
the corporate big boys—or girls. Having grown up on feminism, and—due to
race and class privilege as well as often having white, mainstream feminist
mothers—having experienced “women’s equality” as an unquestionable fact, this
group exemplified an “anything you can do, I can do better” ethos.
Yet, these “Dissenting Daughters,” as Siegel refers to them,21 were largely
invested in presenting a controversial, “all new” polemic. They consequently
attracted much criticism from elder feminists as well as from their
contemporaries who denounced “power feminists’” misrepresentation of
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feminist history and co-optation of feminist politics. Siegel, for instance, makes
note of their many omissions, errors, and reductions,22 and Baumgardner and
Richards comment that Roiphe “doesn’t appear to understand that one can be
both pro-sex and anti-rape.”23 Additionally, it is important to note that in their
critique of victim-centered rape crisis advocacy, writers like Roiphe and Denfeld
fail to recognize that older feminists such as the brilliant Marxist feminist Angela
Davis have long generated critiques of the anti-rape movement on the basis that
it lacks any awareness or analysis of the implications of racist and capitalist
oppression on rape perpetration, conviction, and legislation.24
Older feminists widely defended themselves against reductive “power
feminist” critiques by insisting that feminism is not monolithic; that although
some feminist theory has been victim-centered, any portrayal that suggested this
was the feminist norm was gravely ahistorical. The resounding defense was that
feminism has always placed primacy on women’s choice—to have or not to have
sex, to experience pleasure when and how and with whom they wanted. The
“Dissenting Daughters” were also severely criticized on the grounds that they
were reformist, and centered their politics on preserving their class interests. Bell
hooks, for instance, criticized power feminists for “soft-selling” feminism,
regressing to white, privileged class reformist feminism, and denying the radical
roots of 1960s-1970s feminism.25 Likewise, Carolyn Sorisio critiques the fact that
so-called power feminists resubscribe to the reformist notion that all women are
equally oppressed, and neglect to generate “any substantive, sustained analysis”
of women of color feminisms. ”Quite simply,” she writes,
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these books leave their implied white middle- and upperclass readers feeling just too good about their own power
as Americans. For them, victimization gets in the way of
the relatively privileged. It somehow messes up their
access to the boys’ world of sex and capital. This is not the
direction that feminism should take. Rather, we must
continue efforts to become more refined in our
understanding of victimization and oppression.26
Both hooks and Sorisio also note that these writers tend to essentialize the
category “woman,” and point out that Paglia in particular outrageously
advocates biological determinism, or essential, biological differences between the
nature of men and women.27
However, the controversy stirred up by these critiques only caused the
“new feminist” vanguard to receive unprecedented mainstream success and
frequently enjoy bestseller status. Indeed, Baumgardner and Richards reveal that,
in Katie Roiphe’s case, the publisher accepted her book The Morning After: Sex,
Fear, and Feminism on Campus solely because he thought it promised to be
controversial—based on his young female assistant’s harsh critique of the
manuscript’s politics.28 Although this book failed to become a best seller, it was
intensely publicized: Baumgardner and Richards refer to it as “the most talked
about book never read.”29 As bell hooks notes, the “[t]he patriarchal-dominated
mass media is far more interested in promoting the views of women who want
both to claim feminism and repudiate it and the same time,” and who openly
accept patriarchal sexuality; falsely perceived “as the more liberal feminist voices
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countering those taken to embody strident, narrow anti-sex standpoints … these
women are offered up by the white male-dominated mass media as the hope of
feminism.”30 This fact is not only an annoyance to feminists who fear that
feminist politics are being misrepresented: it also constitutes a very real threat to
revolutionary anti-racist writers and theorists because these voices—white,
mostly privileged class, and reformist—are the only ones the media is interested
in hearing. Accordingly, the power to define feminism and feminist praxis on a
national scale is relegated to these particular voices. Women outside of this white
elite are silenced by racist feminism yet again.31

~

* ~

Yet shortly after these controversial voices enraptured American
patriarchal culture, a new group of young feminists began engaging in activism
and producing more radical literature that emphasized different issues,
including more analyses of race, class, and sexuality. While they echo power
feminists’ call for a “new” feminism that is freer, more joyful, and places primacy
on sexual freedom and a woman’s right to pleasure as a fundamental feminist
right—and consequently are subject to many of the same critiques about lack of
historical awareness as their power feminist cohorts—they don’t drop the ball
quite as severely when it comes to radical leftist politics. These feminists are
white as well as black, brown, Asian, Latina, or mixed race; they are collegeeducated or not; they are gay, straight, transgendered, bisexual, or something
else altogether; they are from varying class backgrounds; some are married,
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some are mothers, other are both or neither; they are men as well as women. In
short, they are a collective that strives to embrace the variation and “diversity” of
their lived experience and build a space where their ambiguities could be
honored and accepted. In place of traditional identity politics that are considered
to have a separatist, dichotomous impulse,32 these writers wanted to create
“authentic” identities that crossed lines and defied definition.
This was the group of young twenty-something feminists that declared
themselves to be the “third wave” of feminism. Henry explains that the term
“third wave” is defined by three key components which she describes as follows:
1) generational age, 2) historical moments, and 3) ideological position.33
Generational age refers to the age of feminists in this wave, which is typically
defined as “Generation X” or people born between 1961 and 1981. Historical
moment refers to the global political and cultural condition that defines life for
this generation, which in turn defines the ideological positions a given
generation will choose to organize around. That is, because today’s issues are
dominated by concerns like the development of information technology; the
increasingly globalized economy and the structures of inequality and
exploitation it affords; neocolonial domination of “third world” nations via
military deployment and economic control; and global health and environmental
epidemics like AIDS and deforestation,34 social justice activists today are
necessarily going to locate their efforts across a new spectrum of issues and
according to a new set of ideologies.
This notion of a “generation” is problematic insofar as it assumes
monolithic identification and false unity across a given age group. As Henry
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notes, it is often taken for granted that feminists of a common age “will, naturally,
share a generational identity,”35 when in reality there are multiple divisions
between feminists (or any people) in a common age group as determined by
social status, life experience, and degree of privilege. That is, if generational age
is supposed to define one’s historical moment, and historical moment is defined
by political and cultural issues, there will be different perceptions of the
“historical moment” within a given age group. For instance, the political and
cultural issues definitive to a white, college-educated, young professional from
suburbia will be significantly dissimilar from those definitive to a black, highschool educated, poor or blue collar worker from the inner city. And if historical
moment defines ideological position, that will vary just as extensively. It is
therefore impractical to define ay group of individuals by “generational age”
alone, isolated from sociocultural implications.36 The “third wave,” then, is a
problematic construction since it relies on identification across a common
generational age and implied ideological cohesion.
Because this “third wave” was born into the legacy of the “second wave,”
and because those with race and/or class privilege grew up enjoying a
considerable degree of legislative equality due to feminism’s historical battles
and successes, many of these feminists grew up taking women’s rights for
granted. As Baumgardner and Richard articulately explain, “For our generation,
feminism is like fluoride. We scarcely notice that we have it—it’s simply in the
water.”37 It must be noted that this statement is problematic insofar as not all
women grew up with feminism in the water—at least not to the same extent: just
as different water supplies contain varying amounts of fluoride, people
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experience different degrees and different types of feminism(s) depending on
their economic, cultural, or racial backgrounds. This crucial criticism
notwithstanding, the point is that the tangibility of feminist history causes many
women of this era to come into feminism in far different ways than their
predecessors.
For instance, in Gloria Steinem’s forward to Rebecca Walker’s landmark
“third wave” anthology, To Be Real: Telling the Truth and Changing the Face of
Feminism, the 1970s feminist icon describes the way she experienced coming into
feminist consciousness: “Our revelations,” she explained, “came from listening to
one anothers’ very different lives, discovering shared themes, realizing we were
neither crazy nor alone, and evolving theories as peers.”38 Today, on the other
hand, women in mainstream Western society develop a feminist consciousness
through media, books, parents, siblings, or women’s studies curricula: that is, if
women have access to Western media and educational curricula, they may grow
up with a specific notion of feminism already established in their psyches.
Consequently, according to Henry, women of the so-called third wave who grew
up with women’s liberation as a birthright have a tendency to be more confident
of their personal power, that is, their ability to control their own lives, whereas
they are less idealistic in terms of their ability to agitate for significant social
transformation.39 To a considerable extent, this ethos can be summarized by the
two types of “woman power” writer Danzy Senna describes grappling with
throughout her childhood: “Always wear lipstick. Never get married.”40
So what does this “third wave” want? What, that is, are its goals, agendas,
and activism? It is indicative of the historical moment—characterized by
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consumerism and individualism—that young feminists organize and engage in
activism in different ways than previous generations of feminists. Today, rather
than fomenting a nation-wide mass movement, feminists are likely to get
involved with local/community activism and/or to devote their labors to
cultural or literary production.41 Furthermore, having recognized the
interconnections between “various tendencies toward domination,”42 today
feminists (or anti-sexist activists, if they chose not to identify as feminist, per se)
are increasingly likely engage in multi-issue work under the umbrella of
feminism, to come to feminism through other movements, or vice versa—to
engage in pro-feminist activism by radicalizing around other progressive/social
justice issues.43 For instance, Robin Templeton, in her essay “She Who Believes in
Freedom: Young Women Defy the Prison-Industrial Complex,” discusses how
many young feminist-minded women—especially urban black and Latina
women—are getting involved in criminal justice, prison reform, and youth antiviolence organizations, rather than women’s organizations: they are “synergizing
race and gender issues and moving forward.”44 Other women engage in activism
through cultural production like performance, poetry, and filmmaking; for
instance, Rachel Raimist has produced films about women pioneers of hip hop,
jessica Care moore performs spoken-word poetry about women and sexism in
rap music, Sarah Jones performs anti-sexist spoken-word poetry, theatre, and
one-woman shows, and Holly Bass performs in hip hop theatre and writes about
women’s roles therein.
Another feminist subculture that found new ways to engage in feminist
activism and feminist culture—especially popular in the mid nineties—was the
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Riot Grrrl punk scene. Known for their “anger and energy,” Riot Grrls originated
from a collective of punk-rock girl musicians in Seattle, Olympia, WA and
Washington D.C. who “were taking what they knew from women’s studies, their
community activism, and their own lives to infiltrate and transform” the punk
rock scene, which “had become a macho subculture.”45 In addition to tough girl
punk music from bands like Bikini Kill and Huggy Bear, Riot Grrrls soon became
intensely popular, finding mainstream popularity and recognition through the
production of hundred of zines nationwide. Small, Xeroxed, do-it-yourself
fanzines and magazines that subverted dominant publishing paradigms, zines
provided a desperately needed respite from mainstream women’s and girls’
magazines that attempted to indoctrinate the “fairer sex” with fat phobia and
rampant consumerism. To girls everywhere, zines were a portal to feminist
consciousness or to a community of like-minded young women.46 In the words
of Baumgardner and Richards, Riot Grrls “were righteous and intent on
challenging all forms of oppression: hatred of punks and kids who looked
different, classism, the marginalization of sex workers, as well as sexism, racism,
ableism, and homophobia.”47
Moreover, writers such as Baumgardner and Richards explain that “third
wave” feminism frequently represents a “feminist diaspora” in which young
women regularly define their feminism according to innumerably varying
issues.48 Using the term “diaspora” unconventionally to reflect the dispersal of an
ideology, rather than of people, Baumgardner and Richards note that many
young feminists modify or qualify the term “feminist” to expand it’s meaning, to
“feel described rather than confined by a term.”49 For instance, women or men
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may identify as a postmodern, pro-sex, Prada, lipstick, academic, radical, Marxist,
cyber, Latina, cultural, eco, lesbian, transex, sex-radical, womanist, animals rights,
diva, international, Jewish, or pock rock feminist,50 each of which indicate
specific politics, interests, or identities with a particular feminist spin. Two
expressions of such “diasporic feminisms” within the third wave are hip hop
feminism51 and Girlie feminism, both of which are informed by a combination of
cultural and feminist interests.
As Baumgardner and Richards describe it, “Girlie presumes that women
can handle the tools of patriarchy and don’t need to be shielded from them.”
Combining feminist empowerment with a penchant for fashion and sparkle,
girlies are feminists who embrace their inner girl but still want to kick some
patriarchy ass, who want to have their cake and eat it to: have an awesome career,
a hot sex life, and the man of her dreams who respects her independence—yet
wants to take care of her. The most popular media representation of
contemporary feminism, girlies are typified by a range of images varying from
the leading characters of Bridget Jones, Sex and the City, and Ally McBeal to the
kool-aid hair-dyed punked-out teen with combat books, blue nail polish, and a
baby-doll dress. Basically, girlie culture rebels against the stereotypical
professional seriousness and perceived asexuality of traditional feminists,
against the idea that “since women don’t want to be sexually exploited, they
can’t be sexual … and [against] the idea that girls and power don’t mix.”52 The
prevailing ideology of this pro-woman camp is that women aren’t duped into
patriarchal beauty standards; they are making the best choice they can to ensure
survival and success in a sexist society.53 If their feminist predecessors wanted to
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shed the trappings of patriarchy—makeup, shaving, skirts—these girlies are in
the business of reclaiming them. As Debbie Stoller of Bust magazine states,
“today's vampy visionaries believe that it is possible to make a feminist fashion
statement without resorting to wearing Birkenstocks 24-7, or hiding our figures
in power suits. We've taken our shoulder pads and stuffed them into our bras, no
longer disguising ourselves as men, but as women.”54
Girlies are also known for their unabashed pursuit of sexual pleasure as
an aspect of feminist liberation, and epitomize the new-age quest to bring fun
and sexiness—not to mention some pink and a bit of camp—into feminism.
Across the country, from Soho to Seattle, girlies have opened an entire collection
of “feministy,” woman-centered sex shops; as Debbie Stoller muses, “Call us dome feminists, call us pro-sex feminists, just don't call us late for the sale at Good
Vibrations. In our quest for sexual satisfaction, we shall leave no sex toy
unturned and no sexual avenue unexplored.”55
However, in addition to being criticized by second wave for their
historical myopia, for “inventing” things and “pioneering” ideals that have long
been important feminist ideologies, girlies are also accused of being consumed
with pop culture and being depoliticized, and for lacking any intersectional
analyses of race and class. Cultivated primarily from pop culture’s co-optation
and assimilation of Riot Grrrl aesthetics, girlie feminism is often characterized as
the lite, pre-packaged, white-washed and commodified “Spice Girls” brand of
Girl Power. Girlies are often characterized as women who feel empowered as
women, but who don’t necessarily want to engage with feminist politics to
challenge the status quo outside of their own upwardly mobile and privileged
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lives. Indeed, as Baumgardner and Richards note, girlies often feel the need to
reject politics altogether, mistaking it for another second wave institution that
they want to subvert and recreate.56 Further, “[t]he fact that most of the Girlies
are white, straight, work outside the home, and belong to the consumer class
provides some explanation for why they choose to promote certain issues”—
such as date rape, day care, employment equity, and censorship, when and if
they do engage in politics.57
It is also crucial to note that “white Girlies appear to be borrowing,
consciously or subconsciously, from black women in popular culture when they
talk about femininity and strength.”58 For instance, Tara Roberts, a black feminist
journalist, can’t relate to girlie feminism; rather, she explains that “Girl power—
this tough, sexy woman who is speaking her mind—is not something new to
black women.”59 Roberts notes that this was the kind of women’s empowerment
she saw in her high school, the kind of feminism represented by rappers like SaltN-Peppa. Indeed, this is the ideology of another branch of the third wave
diaspora: hip hop feminism.
Hip hop feminism in many ways exists on the edge of the “third wave”
collective; some hip hop feminist writers chose to identify as part of the “third
wave” whereas others chose to maintain a distance between themselves and any
mainstream feminist movement. Hip hop feminists claim woman power but
maintain a politicized edge, and—unlike girlie feminists who want to abandon
the institutions of their feminist past—envision themselves using the tools of
traditional black womanhood and black feminism rather than subverting and
rebelling against them. That is, instead of ditching the politics of their black
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feminist/womanist foremothers, they simply articulate them in new ways to
make them pertinent to today’s youth and the issues, environment, and historical
moment they confront in their daily lives.60 Hip hop feminist scholar and writer
Gwendolyn D. Pough, for instance, maintains that “Black feminism has had to
take on a hip-hop slant in order to reach the generation that needs to utilize it.”61
In addition to using hip hop to reach out to the new generation, black feminism
of today has also been greatly influenced by hip hop and hip hop politics: they
locate a source of power in female emcees on one hand, and on the other hand
they invest considerable energy organizing around sexism, misogyny, and
exploitation of women that abounds in rap music and other hip hop cultural
productions.
Many hip hop feminists locate a source of power in hip hop, particularly
in the pro-woman lyrics of women artists like Queen Latifah, MC Lyte, and SaltN-Peppa and sometimes in what is considered the sexually transgressive ethos of
bombshells Lil’ Kim and Foxy Brown. Pough, for instance, explains that women
rappers and the answer raps they produced “let [her] know [she] could have a
voice as well. They offered the strong public presence of Black womanhood that
[she] had seen in [her] mother and her friends but had not witnessed in [her]
generation in such a public forum.”62 The fact that many of these answer raps
were “talking back and speaking out against unwanted advances that could
easily be read as sexual harassment” also gave women like Pough and her peers
the tools to handle similar incidents that she they faced in their daily urban
lives.63 Other hip-hop feminists like Ayana Byrd note that there is a pervasive
trend in hip hop of “hypersexual, yet decidedly pro-woman persona[s]”—such
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as those of Lil’ Kim—that present images of sexually transgressive women who
are owning and controlling their own bodies and their own sexualities.64
Yet on the other hand, many of the same women who recognize the
potential power represented by black women in control of their own sexualities
are frequently divided unto themselves, questioning the ways commodified
portrayals of sexual black women may implicate and perpetuate racist
stereotypes of the hypersexual and perpetually available black woman—
stereotypes that have been in existence since the antebellum era. Indeed, even as
Byrd notes that there is a potential power in representations like Lil’ Kim and
Foxy Brown, she explains the difficulty of having to continuously negotiate two
stereotypical extremes: the sexless mammy and the Hottentots Venus.65 She
explains that
while, yes, these assertions of sexual agency were a direct
challenge to the notion that black male sexuality within hip-hop
exists as a conquering force over women, it was, to put it in blunt
vernacular, getting tired … The shock has worn off and what is
left is confirmation of something that many men of all races and
quite a few non-black women had always suspected: black
women were whores.66
However, such a statement assumes that female “sexual agency” only operates
insofar as it resists domination by male sexual agency, and the only power it
possesses is that of shock value. In other words, the mentality is that there is a
contradictory relationship between “hypersexuality” and “pro-woman”
aesthetics, rather than the former being used as a powerful vehicle to express the
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later. And the mentality is that there is only one way to “be” a woman or to
perform femininity: the traditional Euro-American way. Therefore, a statement
like this replicates Western notions of sexuality and power, as opposed to
searching for alternate conceptions of woman power and different languages for
anti-sexism, beyond Western feminist traditions.67
Indeed, to this end, scholars who study hip hop (“feminist” or not) are
increasingly analyzing the ways in which femme fatale rappers like Lil’ Kim are
advocating empowerment—and deconstructing binary gender norms—in their
subversion and lyrical amalgamation of traditional Western gender identities.
For instance, Imani Perry writes that rappers like Kim “visually look femme, but
simultaneously occupy male spaces linguistically.”68 And Greg Thomas asserts
that Lil’ Kim—or Big Momma/Queen B., as she alternately names herself—
“overturns male domination, lyrically, and rigid, homophobic gender identity on
record—way more effectively than any elite Women’s or Gay & Lesbian Studies
program in academia. Her whole system of rhymes radically redistributes
power, pleasure and privilege, always doing the unthinkable, embracing
sexuality on her kind of terms.”69 Inherent in this criticism is the point that
“feminism” is not the only way to enforce anti-sexist praxis: indeed, many hip
hop artists utilize these other anti-sexist languages rather than align with
Western feminism. Moreover, inherent in this criticism is the idea that there are
no rigid, biologically-defined categories of “man” and “woman,” with no
variation, ambiguity, or overlapping in between. This is in stark contradiction to
Western social norms that strictly subscribe to such sex/gender dichotomies;
even feminism, in theorizing about patriarchal sex roles and lesbianism, has yet
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to create sustained criticism of such biologized binaries—perhaps because
Western languages and societies inadequately allows for such explorations.
Indeed, at certain moments and in certain discourses feminism relies on notions
of gender-difference. Hence, there are not only varying notions of anti-sexism;
there are abundantly varying notions of gender and sexuality. However, the
historically white, Western, and middle-class perspective of mainstream
feminism implicitly privileges the “feminist” discourse above other global antisexist praxis, allowing “feminism” to be regularly defined and recognized as the
language of anti-sexism, rather than one variation/articulation. Therefore,
insofar as hip hop feminism begins to examine other ways of engaging in antisexist work beyond traditional feminism, there is tremendous potential for
expanding “feminist” dialogue.
Many hip hop feminists also take serious issue with the sexism and
misogyny that is often prevalent in rap music and videos. For instance, Tara
Roberts wrote in 1994 that, while she deeply respected the visionary pioneers of
rap, and valued hip hop culture and the tools it provides young people of color
for the production of a public voice, she was taking a “hip-hop hiatus.” Although
hip hop is part of her and indeed defines her in many ways, “if [she] has no
space to be [herself] freely and openly without the [sexist] stereotypes and hatred,
then [her] voice is erased, deemed invalid as [her] brothers, proposing to speak
for [her], reduce [her] to a bitch, a hoe or a skeezer to be stuck, beat up, or f--ed.”70 Byrd articulates that while she is not personally offended by sexist lyrics
because she is not a “bitch” or a “ho,” the problem is that too many of the males
rappers themselves don’t know she isn’t—and the little girls watching and
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emulating “video hoes” are getting all the wrong messages about what it means
to be a woman.71,72
Yet other hip hop feminists have found ways to negotiate their love of hip
hop culture and rap music with their feminist politics. For instance, shani jamila
writes that the relationship between black women and men involves many
conflicts and tensions, yet “there is no sole place to lay blame for our complicated
gender dynamics, like the nigga/bitch syndrome which is typically the
immediate culprit… In order to truly understand our issues, we need to be able
to deconstruct larger raced, classed, and gendered realm in which they
operate.”73 Moreover, resonating with the “third wave” call for contradiction and
ambiguity, Eisa Davis explains that she “can’t have a vision of political practice
anymore that makes no space for pleasure, conflict, personal and collective
responsibility to cohabitate simultaneously.”74 She describes her new vision as
one that includes an immunity to sexist rap lyrics, not because she is numb or
weary to the sexism, but because she no longer subscribes to a “puritanical,
dualistic feminism that recognizes only indignant innocence … or unenlightened
guilt … [She doesn’t] have to choose.”75 Most importantly, she explains, “I don’t
want to censor or dismiss my culture, my language, my sense of community
regardless of the form in which it comes. Hip hop, after all, is the chosen
whipping boy for a misogyny that is fundamental to Western culture. Why
should I deny myself hip hop but get a good grounding in Aristotle?”76 In other
words, misogyny is fundamental to Western culture. The fact that rap music is
the expression of misogyny most demonized in North American culture must be
critically interrogated, given that it is the cultural production originated by poor,
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inner city, black youth, whose subjugation has historically been foundational to
Western capitalism.
This latter argument is a crucial one, and one that is echoed by writers
like Cheo H. Coker, who writes that “The question isn’t why there’s so much
misogynistic hip-hop; it’s why the powers that be focus only on hip-hop’s
misogyny.”77 He further articulates the fact that the White financial powers who
produce rap music have “weaned an entire American generation on sex and
violence.”78 Additionally, bell hooks has taken up this issue in her essay
“Gangsta Culture—Sexism and Misogyny: Who Will Take the Rap?” Here, hooks
explains that “gangsta rap does not appear in a cultural vacuum,” that rather it is
“expressive of the cultural crossing, mixings, and engagement of black youth
with the values, attitudes, and concerns of the white majority.”79 Indeed, she
explains that sexist trends in hip hop simply respond to the sexist and
homophobic environment of white supremacist capitalist patriarchy, take
advantage of messages and themes are most profitable, and thus rappers are
scapegoated for doing patriarchy’s dirty work.80 As the rap industry is whitefunded and thrives off a largely white fan base, hooks explains that it may be
“useful to think of misogyny as a field that must be labored in and maintained
both to sustain patriarchy but also to nourish an anti-feminist backlash. And
what better group to labor on this ‘plantation’ than young black men?”81 Hence,
elder black feminists like hooks and younger hip hop feminists like Davis agree
that feminists should generate a critique of sexism, particularly through (nonaccusatory) dialogue with black men, but that it should be conducted with a
sustained acknowledgement of the context out of which sexism occurs. As hip
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hop feminist dream hampton explains, “Hip-hop may be guilty of pimping and
parading the worst of Black America, but rap music cannot be made responsible
for this nation’s institutional racism and sexism.”82
~

*

~

As elucidated by these two very different expressions of feminism, the
politics and culture of the “third wave” span a tremendous spectrum, making it
extraordinarily difficult to outline a specific agenda or even a cohesive
constituency. As a result, until recently no set of “third wave” political objectives
had been clearly articulated; but in 2000 Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy
Richards took it upon themselves to create the “Third Wave Manifesta.”83 They
identified a thirteen-point agenda including issues such as the creation of a large,
visible feminist movement and voting block; protection and expansion of
reproductive rights including accessible and affordable birth control, practical
sex education, freedom from sterilization abuse, and equal adoption rights for
gay couples and individuals; the promotion of male accountability in the area of
sexual health; queer rights; equity for women in the military; work equity;
freedom from hate and bullying; and, finally, the ratification of the Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA).
The objectives presented on this list are clearly informed by 1960s-1970s
feminist politics, signifying that the legacy of the United States feminist “second
wave” is being embraced and carried on by Baumgardner and Richards’ vision.84
Yet young feminists are not typically so accepting of traditional politics, even if
they do claim a continuous feminist legacy.85 Indeed, the “third wave” has a
record similar to that of power feminism in terms of its (a)historical reductionism,
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specifically within the area of sexual freedom, a topic which is central to the
construction of this “wave” identity. Frequently internalizing antifeminist or
extremist media stereotypes and characterizing older feminists as restrictive
mother figures, many young feminists claim to be “newer” and “sexier” than
their forerunners. According to Henry, as a collective that was raised with sexsaturated popular culture and understands sexual freedom to be “a fundamental
right, much like the right to vote,”86 feminists of the “third wave” “often feel
entitled to pursue their pleasure in ways which an earlier generation of women
might not have felt so comfortable in doing or may have been prohibited from
doing altogether.”87 But of course, such a statement assumes that all feminists in
the late 1960s and 1970s were rigidly anti-pleasure, when in fact many were sexradicals and were veritable pioneers of the sexual revolution.
Finally, the most definitive feature of the “new” wave of feminism is its
commitment to the rhetoric of inclusion, contradiction, and ambiguity. In an age
when people often cross borders freely and frequently—borders of nation, race,
class, sexuality, and culture—and where there is widespread understanding of
the intersectional nature of multiple and simultaneous oppressions, progressive
young adults today are often unable or unwilling to locate themselves in narrow,
dichotomous identity categories or to rank/distinguish between oppressions.
Although these theories precisely replicate those generated within the discourses
of U.S. third world/woman of color feminism, particularly in the late 1970s and
1980s, young feminists by and large use their dedication to inclusivity and
postmodernist theories of identity to signal that theirs is a “new and improved”
feminism which surpasses and distances itself from “outmoded” and racist
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feminist identity politics. Specifically, intersectionality is used to claim evolution
or superiority over the “second wave”: as Henry has pointed out, painting earlier
feminist movement as monolithically racist not only allowed “third-wave
feminists to position themselves as superior to the feminists of the past in their
seeming ability to make their feminism anti-racist from its inception,” but also
caused anti-racist critiques by black feminists, womanists, U.S. third world
feminists, and/or woman of color feminists of the sixties, seventies, and eighties
to be further marginalized and silenced.88 The implication, therefore, is that black,
woman of color, or U.S. third world feminist discourses are outside of official
feminist history, and therefore not really defining this “third wave” feminism.
For instance, Labaton and Martin write, “The feminism of younger
activists goes beyond the rhetoric of inclusion. The most significant lesson that
we have learned from the second wave’s faux pas is that a feminist movement
cannot succeed if it does not challenge power structures of wealth and race.”89
While the critique presented in this statement could not be truer—and while
black, Latina, Chicana, Native American, Asian American, and/or working-class
women (as well as lesbian or bisexual women) were marginalized in 1960s-1970s
feminist movement—the damage occurs when the writers suggest that similar or
even identical critiques were never generated within the “second wave” of
feminism: while they appear to be defending the interests of racial equality
within feminism, they are so eager to claim superiority in order to establish an
original, independent “wave” identity that they only succeed in appropriating
black feminist and woman of color/U.S. third world feminist politics and theory
while denying credit where credit is due.
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Moreover, a close reading of some so-called third wave texts suggests
that maybe some third wavers aren’t actually so committed to extending the
“rhetoric of inclusion”—or at least are unsuccessful in their endeavor, becoming
blinded or shortsighted by idealistic assumptions that equality within feminist
has already been achieved. For instance, in ManifestA Jennifer Baumgardner and
Amy Richards repeatedly make generalizations about “all” women, neglecting to
interrogate matters of race or class difference in anything but superficial, even
tokenizing ways. That is, these writers embrace “diversity,” but they assume that
it is a given: it was a problem that was faced in earlier feminist movement, but
one that has since been resolved; and it is not a subject warranting sustained
analysis or critique. They often portray race issues as peripheral to feminist
issues, and write astounding, audacious statements that minimize the toll of
racist feminism such as “There have always been black women in the movement—and
the movement has always been more diverse than the mainstream.”90 At another point,
they talk about discovering “the real stories behind the myths,” such as that
“many women of color really did feel alienated from the movement”—as if that
is a surprise, is questionable, or is not still true in contemporary feminist
movement.91 They also clearly universalize gender, failing to account for ways in
which women outside of the white, middle-class elite were or were not served by
monumental feminist improvements and talk about feminism in an exclusively
Western context;92 and in their discussion of why many young women fear
identifying as “feminists,” they neglect to mention that white feminists’ racism
deters many women.93
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Indeed, Rebecca Hurdis discusses at length the racist reductionisms of
ManifestA. She notes that, despite the fact that the book is marketed as the
definitive “third wave” text, she found in its pages “the specific history of white
(privileged) women.”94 However, the biggest flaw according to Hurdis is that
Baumgardner and Richards don’t admit this is the project of their book, bur
rather “they assert that this book is a history of all women, dropping the names
of such women of color as Rebecca Walker and Audre Lorde.”95 She concludes,
“there is no extensive discussion of women of color feminism. This indicates that
Baumgardner and Richards feel as though this is a separate issue, a different
kind of feminism. It is as if their work is the master narrative of feminism, with
women of color feminism as an appendage.”96 This fact is crucial since, as
previously noted, these women are the ones presuming to outline a “Third Wave
Manifesta” when clearly, the feminist schema they represent betrays one of most
fundamental ideologies of “third wave” feminism.

Not Waves, Oceans: Rocking the Boat and reforming the
feminist Vision

Some scholars, such as Leslie Heywood and Jennifer Drake, editors of
Third Wave Agenda: Being Feminist, Doing Feminism, as well as Astrid Henry have
noted that the insights so near and dear to “third wave” theorizing were quite
literally pioneered by U.S. third world/women of color feminists in the seventies
and eighties.97 For instance, Drake and Heywood credit texts like Barbara Smith’s
Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology (1983) and Gloria Anzaldua’s and Cherrie
Moraga’s This Bridge Called My Back: Writings By Radical Women of Color (1981) as
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having laid the groundwork for a feminism defined by contradiction.98 And yet,
we must ask: if still called the “third wave”—a construct which is frequently
defined by having generated or implemented feminist theories of contradiction
for the first time, and which places the writing of Smith, Anzaldua, and Moraga
outside of feminism due to the standard belief that “second wave” feminism
“ended” in the late seventies while the “third wave” did not begin until the early
nineties—can such a legacy to women of color feminist critiques ever be
appropriately honored or dealt with?
To this question, I must answer in the negative. Although establishing
and honoring diversity is ostensibly a main goal of this “wave,” it frequently gets
glossed over or assumed as a given, rather than sincerely being critiqued,
analyzed and worked on. An in-depth examination of generational dynamics
and negotiation of feminist legacies strongly suggests that, due to the
conceptualization of the movement as “third wave,” unnecessary divisions are
constructed between generation, nation, and culture that are contradictory to its
most central and sacred visions, and which therefore reinscribe reductive means
of feminist historicizing.
Hence, I argue herein that by identifying as the “third wave,”
contemporary feminist movement assumes continuity with a movement that has
historically been racist, classist, and Eurocentric, even as it rebels against. That is,
while United States feminists have generated much revolutionary anti-racist,
anti-classist, and anti-homophobic critique, the mainstream “first” and “second”
waves have been decidedly white, bourgeois, and elitist. Therefore, although the
new wave claims to have internalized these criticisms, the adoption of a “third
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wave” identity construction locates this movement within the same historical
trajectory as imperialist, racist, and classist feminist predecessors. To that end, a
“third wave” construction furthermore assumes continuity with exclusively
Western and historically imperialist feminist movement. This fact excludes or
diminishes possibilities for meaningful coalition with women and men of other
nations/cultures, and impedes the viability of alternate, non-Western notions of
feminism, womanhood, and anti-sexist movement.
In addition to interfering with transnational coalition, the “third wave”
construction distances itself and causes generational conflict with—as well as
claims superiority over—the “second wave” movement, even as it claims its
legacy and often values its contributions and successes. The “third wave”
identity furthermore assumes a “new” and “different” feminism which erases or
discredits feminist theory by women of color (and progressive white women)
that existed prior to the inception of the “third wave” (including theory from the
“second wave” and from the time between “waves”). And finally, the conflicted
juxtaposition between the “second” and “third wave” erases/overshadows
feminist theory—especially but not limited to that women of color writers and
activists—which was generated at the cusp of/in between “waves.”
Therefore, as the current “third wave” formulation serves very limited
functions yet is responsible for creating multiple divisions and conflicts which
are antithetical to revolutionary feminist praxis, it behooves feminist theorists to
generate a new conceptualization for 21st century feminism. Accordingly, an
essential way for feminists to get serious about legitimate99 border crossing and
establish an international coalition against sexist, racist, imperialist, and capitalist
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oppression is for feminists to stop using isolationist rhetoric like “third wave,”
which presupposes an exclusively Western and middle class feminist legacy as
well as necessarily fragments the movement into falsely unified generational
sects. Such a transition is necessitated if feminism is to be accurately and
effectively (re)historicized.
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Wipe Out!, orTrouble on the Home Front:
matraphors, generational conflict, and the trouble with catching the
wave

“As far as I can tell, the third wave is just
the second wave with more lip gloss.”
-Anonymous100

In traditional feminist historicization, periods of active, momentous, and publicly
visible feminist movement are typically categorized into waves, or eras
characterized by common agendas, objectives, and politics. In ManifestA, Jennifer
Baumgardner and Amy Richards define a “wave” as “a swelling of momentum
that has carried us closer to women’s equality.”101 According to traditional
history, there have been two waves of feminism in the United States thus far,
with the third wave currently on the rise. While my intention here is to
destabilize and problemetize the notion of “waves,” I will refer to them in this
chapter according to how they have been previously defined.
The “first wave,” the beginning of which was heralded by the Seneca
Falls Convention102 in 1848 and the end of which is generally signified by the
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment which made women’s suffrage a
constitutional right, was a period of approximately seventy-five years that is
memorialized most definitively by the pursuit of women’s suffrage. Elizabeth
Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, Sojourner Truth, and Alice Paul are among the
most eulogized leaders-cum-heroines of this era; spanning up to three
generations, feminists103 of the first wave fought for not only suffrage but total
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legal enfranchisement via constitutional rights to property, inheritance, and
divorce, among others, and drafted the original Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).
Additionally, these women were also frequently involved in children’s and
workers’ rights campaigns, and the “first” feminists were typically mobilized
into consciousness and action via their participation in abolitionist circles.
However, despite these abolitionist roots, the most powerful feminist sects of this
era grew increasingly conservative, adopting xenophobic and elitist agendas to
protect their own interests—namely women’s suffrage, birth control, and
women’s rights to independent economic ownership—from the criticism of
powerful white male legislators and decision-makers. Black women were
severely marginalized, and the most radical feminists (of all races) were written
out of history. For instance, to the limited extent that black women are included
in North American feminist history and curricula from this era, the radical antiracist work of Ida B. Wells Barnett and Frances Ellen Watkins Harper is
overshadowed by tokenized and distorted images of Sojourner Truth—who is
likely to be the only black woman mentioned in mainstream accounts of
nineteenth century women’s history. Likewise, although Matilda Joslyn Gage
was a fierce activist who worked tirelessly alongside Stanton and Anthony for
many years, writing, organizing, and lecturing with them, her work was never
consecrated to the status of her companions’ because she was too radically
subversive: she was literally written out of history after her death. 104
The “second wave,” which is also known as the Women’s Liberation
Movement, emerged in the late 1960s. While 1968 is formally identified as the
beginning of this movement, notable feminist achievements were also made
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throughout the early and mid sixties, such as the founding of the National
Organization for Women (NOW) in 1966 by Betty Freidan,105 who was one of the
era’s most iconic leaders and writers along with Gloria Steinem, Shulamith
Firestone, and Kate Millet. This wave is most widely recognized for pioneering
legislation in the areas of equal pay for equal work, sexual harassment, domestic
violence, women’s sexuality, and reproductive rights, especially but not limited
to the right for safe and accessible legalized abortion. This wave also organized
around federally subsidized day care and lobbied for the passage of the ERA, but
these goals remain unfulfilled. Very similarly to the “first wave,” many feminists
in the mid to late 1960s were delivered to gender consciousness by experiencing
sexist marginalization in other “progressive” Leftist movements of the day, such
as the Civil Rights, Student, and Anti-War movements. And yet the second wave
was likewise contaminated by a powerful sect of liberal/reformist white
feminists who used feminism as a vehicle to increase their economic power.106
Furthermore, while there have always been black, brown, Latina, Chicana, Asian
American, and Native American women who were vital contributors to feminist
causes, in the mainstream movement they were either excluded or carelessly
incorporated under the mythical umbrella of “Universal Womanhood.” There
did, however, exist a revolutionary and vocal coalition of black feminist scholars,
writers and activists operating outside of the white feminist mainstream, who
were intensely committed to anti-racist, anti-capitalist and anti-colonial struggle.
Women such as Francis Beale, Angela Davis, Pauli Murray, Michelle Wallace,
Alice Walker, The Combahee River Collective, Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldua,
Cherrie Moraga, Barbara Smith, bell hooks, and innumerable others produced
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groundbreaking radical theory and praxis throughout the so-called second wave
and beyond. Indeed, while most sources record that the second wave of United
States feminism petered out by the end of the 1970s, feminists identifying as
woman of color or U.S. third world continued to produce landmark literature
and activism well into the next decade, passionately challenging and powerfully
changing racist and classist feminist conventions.
And the “third wave,” of course, crested in the early nineties, around
1992, and is yet expanding. It lacks the national visibility and organization of the
former waves, and it does not have iconic leaders for the media to focus on, but it
has an unmistakable voice and presence of its own.
Yet, there is not the same expanse of time between the third wave and its
predecessor as there was between the first and second waves: the first lasted
seventy-five years and spanned three generations of women, and the second did
not rise until well over forty years later, when first wave feminists were by and
large deceased. The third wave, on the other hand, arose only twenty years after
the supposed end of the second wave; so although second wave feminism was
“dead,” second wave feminists were most certainly not. Indeed, not only are they
still alive, many of them are still teaching, writing, and engaging in activism.
And many of them are the same age as—or actually are—the mothers of third
wave feminists.
Thus, not only do third wave feminists look upon second wavers as their
predecessors, imagining themselves as picking up, rebirthing, and/or reclaiming
feminism in a new wave of activity, but third wavers and second wavers
frequently cast each other in the metaphorical roles of “mother” and “daughter.”
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The generational relationships constructed tend to get conflated with the
simultaneously existing wave constructs; that is, the equation becomes second
wave mothers and third wave daughters. This is a conflation that did not play
out in the same way between first and second wave feminists: while the second
wave still imagined the first wave as a preceding generation, the forty-year
interim prevented an explicitly mother-daughter identification.
As Astrid Henry notes in her visionary book Not My Mother’s Sister:
Generational Conflict in Third Wave Feminism, this conflation creates a very
particular phenomenon whereby an intergenerational conflict between second
wave feminists and third wave feminists ensues: third wave “daughters,” who
want to establish themselves as the vanguard of a “new” and “improved”
feminist era, must disidentify107 with their second wave “mothers” by critiquing
the confining moralist, racist, and classist theories and politics generated within
the second wave. As a result, third wavers frequently voice legitimate criticisms
of earlier feminist movement, but due to their desire to seem “progressive,” and
“new,” they neglect to acknowledge the fact that the same critiques were
frequently generated within the second wave movement—often by black, U.S.
third world, and/or women of color feminists, in particular. Hence, wavemandated generational disidentification not only causes intergenerational
discord as the “daughters” critique the “mothers” and the “mothers” respond
defensively; it also implicates an unaccredited assimilation of black and woman
of color feminist theory, even as that theory is regarded as outside of or
peripheral to the traditional master narrative of feminist History.
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Some feminist writers, including Henry in Not My Mother’s Sister and
Baumgardner and Richards in ManifestA, suggest that the panacea for this
generational discord would arise if the new “generation” of feminists were to
locate themselves more fully in the historical moment, and were to imbue
themselves with a comprehensive and accurate understanding of feminist history.
However, by exploring the construction of feminist generations alongside as well
as in addition to an analysis of the historical implications of feminist wave
construction, I contend that this prescribed resolution is impossible. The very act
of wave identification perpetrates intergenerational discord, and interferes with
the development of a legitimately and fundamentally anti-racist feminist
mainstream that recognizes the immense historical contributions of black, U.S.
third world, and/or woman of color feminist predecessors. The wave
construction needs to be abandoned if feminist history is to be narrated in a
manner that goes beyond narrow generational and racial categorizations, and
that can therefore provide space for Western feminism to be understood in
relation to the broader context of global anti-sexist liberation struggles.

Thou Shalt Reject Thy Mothers:
Difficult Daughters, Maligned Mothers, and Fading into the Feminist
Abyss

The up-and-coming generation of feminists began identifying themselves
as the “third wave” in the early 1990s. Astrid Henry attests that the phrase “third
wave” originally appeared in a 1987 essay by Deborah Rosenfelt and Judith
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Stacey; and Naomi Wolf made reference to it in her 1991 bestseller The Beauty
Myth. 108 However, the term is widely attributed to Rebecca Walker, who in 1992
wrote an article for Ms. magazine called “Becoming the Third Wave.” Moreover,
the “third wave” was sometimes used through the late 80s and early 90s in
reference to the new wave of feminism led by U.S. women of color feminists, one
that was “specifically anti-racist in its approach” and “indicate[d] a challenge by
women of color to white feminists.”109 While this anti-racist connotation is often
invoked in current applications of “third wave,” it is invoked in a manner that
threatens to simply assimilate or exploit revolutionary anti-racist rhetoric. The
new usage also adds a specifically generational connotation that did not exist
before: Henry notes that by the mid nineties, the term “had become synonymous
with stressing generational differences from the second wave feminists.”110
There are several reasons for creating an identity based on a “wave.”
According to Henry it is a rhetorical device that signifies both continuity and
discontinuity; implies ideological or political evolution; and, in the process,
allows young feminists to both identity and disidentify with the past. The word
wave suggests historical and ideological continuity in that it necessarily indicates
connection to other waves, yet it connotes a certain degree of separation from
those other waves in its formulation as a new, distinct, and different wave.
Therefore, proclaiming the arrival of a new, different wave also stresses evolution
or progress—within the traditional Western narrative of history. Henry explains
that, taken together, the simultaneous continuity and emphasis on evolution
allows the new “wave” to identify and disidentify with the previous wave of
feminist movement: it identifies via a common history and legacy, yet disidentifies
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by claiming superiority and difference from the existing legacy and can therefore
establish an independent feminism/feminist identity from its predecessors.111
However, when waves are conflated with generations—as the third wave
is conflated with so-called “Generation X” and as the second wave is conflated
with “Baby Boomers” due to synchronous timing between the coming of age of a
generation and the commencement of a wave—a specific phenomenon occurs:
consecutive generations become understood as constituting a mother-daughter
trope, and thus the corresponding waves get cast into the same trope. This occurs
because, as Henry notes, “the term ‘generations’ is almost always dyadic,
referring to just two generations;” this “persistent twoness of generations recalls
the mother-daughter relationship,”112 and thus causes the creation of a matraphor,
a term coined by Rebecca Dakin Quinn to describe “‘the persistent nature of
maternal metaphors in feminism.’”113 This is a limiting construct for feminism
because it necessarily “reduces these potential relationships [between feminists] to
a single relationship: that of mother and daughter.”114
Specifically, the matraphorical construction exacerbates the extent to
which generations are perceived to be coherent, when in fact Henry warns that
“we must be wary of the ways in which it provides a reductive image of
relationships between women, between feminists, and between historical
periods.”115 This is especially problematic for third wave feminists because an
“illusory unity” exists within the generation: whereas members of a generation
must construct a unique identity through “an active identification with their
particular historical moment,” it is generally taken for granted that feminists of a
common age “will, naturally, share a generational identity.”116 Hence, the only
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way that younger feminists can identify a feminism of their own is by actively
disidentifying with earlier feminist generations, especially the “mother”
generation.117
This process of disidentification produces numerous conflicts within
feminism. In addition to constructing a generational identity-by-default that
presumes commonality, erasing the implications of race, class, culture, sexuality,
or religion on the development of a feminist identity, the product of these
identifications and refusals thereof is the simultaneous introduction a host of
inevitable conflicts between figurative mothers and their rebellious daughters.
This situation has effectively situated generational conflict as the most prominent
intersectional/internal feminist conflict of the last several years, displacing vital
analyses of race, wealth, and sexuality from primacy.118 That is, at the same time
as a false and reductive unity is produced between young feminists in order to
collectively disidentify with older feminists, any analysis that would challenge
this illusion of unity is impeded by analyses of conflicts between the two
opposing generations—a situation which is particularly ironic given that the
third wave’s political identity is fundamentally articulated according to a
commitment to intersectionality. The displacement of issues of intersectionality
from critical primacy allows feminist history to be recorded in a way that is
persistently one-dimensional, that lacks interrogation o the real feminist concerns.
Hence, the construction of the “third wave” which necessitates the problematic
disidentification must be dismantled.
According to the theories of Karl Mannheim which Astrid Henry
discusses, generational conflict or interactions can be characterized by two
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models: the romantic-historical model or the positivist model.119 The romantichistorical model idealizes the past and recognizes the passage of time as
inevitably leading toward decline; the positivist, on the other hand, heralds each
consecutive generation as the harbinger of progress.120 Based upon the
construction of disidentification that the third wave must maintain, as previously
explained, the third wave necessarily subscribes to the positivist model.
In accordance with the positivist model, most third wavers assume the
role of the rebellious daughter—a role that allows third wavers to disidentify
with their figurative mothers in order to establish an independent politics.121
That is, by and large a peer-driven movement, the third wave rejects the sage
mother’s wisdom in order to refuse identification.122 Henry describes this process
as committing “psychological matricide,” whereby the mother is killed or erased
so that the daughters can be motherless peers, and explains that matricide is
often precipitated by matraphobia.123 This condition, theorized by Adrienne Rich,
refers to a situation wherein a daughter fears an identification with her mother
that has already been made: that is, it is a daughter’s reaction to her mother’s
interference in her life.124 Matraphobia is also provoked when daughters fear
“falling prey to the indignities of their mothers;” they rebel in order not to lose
themselves.125 Furthermore, Baumgardner and Richards note that third wavers
may reject or dismiss lessons offered by older feminists for a variety of reasons:
perhaps they fear aging, or are too full of youthful optimism and ambition to
accept help from elders; or perhaps they fear becoming burnt out and
impoverished like weathered activists.126
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In correlation, older feminists or feminists of the second wave tend to
assume the position of sage and/or threatened elders, keepers of feminism, who
want to pass down their tried and true wisdom to newcomers. This is the
position many feminists from the second wave tend to assume today: they not
only romanticize the first wave’s triumphs but idealize the good old days of
women’s liberation when women were having their consciousnesses raised,
engaging in national organizing and activism, and generating breakthrough
theory to explain all the ways “the personal [was] political.” Frequently this
translates into an intergenerational power struggle reminiscent of patriarchal
male-female relationship dynamics, wherein older feminists place themselves in
positions of authority—plan the conference, speak on the panel, lead the
organization—while their youngsters get relegated to token positions
moderating the panel, or worse, are stranded in the position of intern/assistant
in which they “get the coffee, make the copies, and wait to be discovered—or, at
least, thanked—by their superiors.”127 Baumgardner and Richards note that
young feminists are often alienated, criticized, and dismissed by their elders;128
and Sarah Boonin offers an important critique of what it means when older
feminists regard younger feminists as “the future”: “Does it mean that we are not
a part of the present, that there is no urgency in the work that must be done
today? …By welcoming our participation at some future dates, the
establishment… shuns any meaningful role we might have alongside them on
the front lines of the current movement.”129
The assumption of these conflicting roles generates considerable friction
between feminists of the third and second “waves,” this competing construct
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causing divergences that are generally unnecessary and which are the result, by
and large, of misunderstanding and misinformation. For instance, in her
introduction to her anthology To Be Real (1995), third wave pioneer Rebecca
Walker writes,
My hope is that this book can help us to see how people in this
world who are facing and embracing their contradictions and
complexities and creating something new and empowering from
them are important voices leading us away from divisiveness and
dualism. I hope that in accepting contradiction and ambiguity, in
using and much more than we use either/or, these voices can help
us continue to shape a political force more concerned with
mandating and cultivating freedom than with policing morality.130
In this statement she is addressing second wave feminists—the feminists she
identifies as her family (including her iconic mother and godmother, Alice
Walker and Gloria Steinem, as well as other aunts and loved ones) and whose
approval she worries about sacrificing with these controversial thoughts.131,132
Her audience is revealed by the fact that she follows this statement with the
cautionary note, “if feminism is to continue to be radical and alive, it must avoid
reordering the world in terms of polarity, be it female/male, good/evil, or, that
easy allegation of false consciousness which can so quickly and silently negate
another’s agency: evolved/unconscious.”133 A legitimate—indeed essential and
acute—observation notwithstanding, this statement eclipses the work of writers
like Gloria Anzaldua who theorized at length about physical, cultural, and
psychological borderlands and the contradictions/ambiguities created therein in
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her seminal work Borderlands/La Frontera (1987), or the powerful theorizing of
Audre Lorde in Sister Outsider (1984) that struggles to construct a place where
men and women can be full human beings divided not amongst themselves
according binary categorizations. It also overlooks the extent to which this
knowledge was central to revolutionary sects of feminism and black
feminism/womanism since the beginning of the Women’s Liberation Movement.
In fact, Walker herself seems ambivalent about the validity of her “new”
claims: whereas she clearly states that the writers in her collection are doing
something “new and empowering” (emphasis added), and decisively suggests
that the second wave is too frequently a source preoccupied with “policing
morality” or placing young feminists and other women into the dichotomous
construct “evolved/unconscious,” she also writes—in the very same passage—
that the voices in her collection “continue to build upon a feminist legacy that
challenges the status quo, finds common ground while honoring difference,” and
refuse to censor parts of their identities according to “an instinct [she] consider[s]
to be the very best legacy of feminism.”134 It is as if Walker needs to find grounds
for disidentification in order to construct a degree of independence from her
feminist mother and loved ones, yet she is caught in a quagmire by underlying
feelings of “dutiful daughter” allegiance and reverence. When this situation is
cognitively associated with the fact that it was Walker who first decisively
proclaimed new age feminism to be the “Third Wave” (even if she did not
necessarily coin the phrase), a great deal about the concept of a third wave
dis/identification is revealed.
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Other contributors to To Be Real resonate with Walker’s call for
recognition of ambiguity. Just one example is Amruta Slee in her essay
“Congratulations, It’s a Girl,” when she candidly declares, “My feminism is not
the feminism of my mother—it starts from a different point and has traveled
different routes. It is a bunch of circumstances in search of a shape and in its
complexities it rejects figures offered to it; the bland Superwoman, the babe with
a gun, the vengeful bad girl, all of them too cartoonish to be of any value.”135 In
her insinuation that the roles offered up to her by her mother’s feminism are too
unreal, to neatly defined to fit her life and her identity, she overlooks the fact that
the two-dimensional images she envisions are the ones produced by the media.
Indeed, she even writes, “I watch films, scan books and newspapers, looking
always for the person I could be, looking for figures of Indian descent who live
messy lives, looking for women who tumble off the track”136—yet it seems not to
occur to her that simplified media images conjured from the occult of pop culture
can never adequately account for an individual’s existence—neither hers nor her
mother’s.
To be sure, “second wave” feminists are hearing these voices and are
responding with their version of events. In the forward to To Be Real, for instance,
second wave writer and frequent media spokeswoman Gloria Steinem remarks
that, reading the manuscript, she was at times frustrated with some of the
contributors’ lack of feminist historical awareness, and she wishes that young
feminists would “talk to people who were in those past [movements], preferably
before doing [their] computer research into media sources of what did or did not
happen.”137 Effectively remarking upon the third wave’s self-defeating tendency
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toward total disidentification, she writes that she wants to “remind readers who
are younger or otherwise new to feminism that some tactical and theoretical
wheels don’t have to be reinvented. You may want to make them a different size
or color, put them on a different wagon, use them to travel in a different
direction, or otherwise make them your own—but many already exist.”138
Furthermore, the equally notable revolutionary Marxist feminist Angela
Davis writes in her afterward to To Be Real that “What I find most interesting
about [the stories in this anthology] is the way many of them imagine a feminist
status quo.”139 She observes that “[w]hile their various imaginations often
represent very different notions of what this feminist status quo might be, many
of them agree that whatever it is, it establishes strict rules of conduct which
effectively incarcerate individuality—desire, career aims, sexual practices, etc,”
and urges young feminists to endeavor to establish “the same kind of nuanced
vision of historical feminism that the anthology wants to apply to third-wave
feminism.”140
It is significant, however, that one of the exceptions to this generational
conflict may be found within contemporary manifestations of black feminism
and womanism, particularly hip hop feminism. Indeed, Astrid Henry notes that
black third wave feminists also construct a matraphorical relationship with elder
black feminists, but often to different ends. She points out that while some young
black feminists—such as Walker and hip hop feminist Joan Morgan—have a
tendency to disidentify with their foremothers by suggesting that the goal of any
new feminism must be “to be real” or “keeping it real,” connoting a quest for
authenticity that, by implication, is lacking in earlier (black) feminisms,141 in
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other situations black feminist matraphors have subversive potential. That is, as
Henry explains, “In naming their mothers’ lessons ‘feminist’, these daughters
challenge both their black mothers’ rejection of feminism as white and white
feminists’ power to name what gets called feminism.”142 In other words, black
feminists who claim the term “feminist” for themselves and their mothers “can
be seen as a challenge to feminism’s whiteness.”143
To that end, Henry postulates that “‘Hip-hop’ might also serve as a
replacement for ‘third-wave,’ another mode of marking generational differences
between second- and third-wave feminisms, civil rights movement and post-civil
rights movement generations.”144 And yet, there is a very noticeable divergence
between the extent to which most mainstream third wave feminists (of any race
or culture) and most young black women who identify specifically as hip hop
feminists embrace the historical feminist traditions of their foremothers. For
instance, in “Do the Ladies Run This…?” Gwendolyn D. Pough explains that hip
hop feminists are all about continuing womanist legacies in the new cultural
context of hip hop, the culture that cradled today’s urban youth from infancy
and which has grown so pervasive that it is recognized—if co-opted—by even
the most privileged suburban white youth. She writes, “Hip-hop feminists are
trying to find ways both to be true to themselves and to listen to the music and
participate in the culture that stimulates the very depth of their souls. And they
are trying to be true to themselves while building on the legacies and the
promises left by the black women who went before them.”145 She explains that
as hip hop was born out of black nationalist traditions, hip hop feminism is a
direct descendent of womanism/black feminism: both traditional womanism
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and hip hop feminism engage in a dialogue with their sometimes misogynistic
and masculinist counterparts—counterparts with whom they are allies in antiracist and anti-capitalist struggle, but whose sexist oppression they refuse to
tolerate—generating a critique but at all costs maintaining an open dialogue that
seeks to reconcile the two groups and therefore work toward common
liberationist ends.146
Further, both womanism and hip hop feminism—while recognizing the
sexism of some black nationalists or hip hoppers—simultaneously recognize the
racism that pervades mainstream white feminism, therefore making it necessary
to form a movement that fights sexist and racist oppression.147 And therefore,
both womanism and hip hop feminism refuse to close the channels of
communication with their male counterparts, and resist separationist impulses of
1970s radical white feminists, because they bespeak the need for liberation of
their entire people. Indeed, both hip hop feminists and black feminists of the
previous generation repeatedly pronounce that survival of both black men and
black women are central on their agenda, and grapple with and try to alleviate
the tension between sexes that so often interferes with what Joan Morgan calls
“black-on-black love.”148
In her book Check it While I Wreck It: Black Womanhood, Hip-Hop Culture,
and the Public Sphere, Gwendolyn Pough also analyzes the ways the rhetorical
devices of hip hop in general and hip hop feminism in particular draw on a long
history of black traditions, especially black abolitionist, liberationist, nationalist
and feminist traditions. A main component of Pough’s analysis, and one cited in
her title, is an excavation of the idea of “bringing wreck,” a concept she describes
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as “a rhetorical act that can be written, spoken, or acted out in a way that shows
resistance.”149 She notes that this rhetoric “has close ties to various other speech
acts that are often linked to Black womanhood: talking back, going off, turning it
out, having a niggerbitchfit, or being a diva.”150 The ideology of bringing wreck,
according to Pough, constitutes a “cipher,” or a process whereby people
collectively build and share knowledge; she explains that black women “keep
their cipher moving through time” by expressing themselves in whatever
medium they have access to, whether through poetry, a quilt, a story, a garden,
or a certain meaningful look or expression.151 Clearly, hip hop feminism is
understood by its advocates as just one in a long line of expressions of black
women’s feminism and anti-racist, anti-sexist theorizing/activism, in a stark
contrast to advocates of third wave feminism who can only form an identity via
disidentification with their predecessors.
This point is crucial to understanding representations of contemporary
feminism, and the cycles of media representations of feminism in general: that is,
while the third wave constitutes the contemporary feminist mainstream just as
white, middle class feminism was the image of feminism offered up to the
masses through media representations in the 1970s, there exist peripheral
feminisms that are inadequately represented. Therefore, since the media
generally dictates what gets memorialized and in effect relegated/consecrated to
historical status, alternate feminisms—which are typically those of traditionally
disempowered and silenced groups, especially women of color—are eclipsed
and fade from collective cultural memory. This process contributes to the
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problematic, reductive, and persistently racist/classist historicization of
feminism.
This truth is precisely illuminated by the third wave’s failure to represent
a comprehensive feminist history, and specifically by third wave literature that
fails to acknowledge differences between the third wave and contemporary
alternative sects, such as hip hop feminism. Indeed, as I will explore in the
following section, this truth is represented by the idea that there is a “crisis” in
feminism due to generational disconnect, one that must be resolved by the third
wave assuming a more romantic-historical positionality.

We Don’t Need No Education:
Learning from History and Resolving the Real Feminist Crises

In her introduction to ManifestA, Jennifer Baumgardner writes that she
was inspired to write that book because she had “realized that the whole
movement was in a kind of crisis: the people who are creating the most inspiring
feminist culture and the people who have a working knowledge of feminist
political change haven’t met yet.”152 Aside from the fact that these groups
apparently refer to predominantly white, often middle or privileged class
feminists—based on the previously established fact that many, if not most,
black/hip hop feminists are quite well acquainted with their respective
legacies—this is a fairly accurate representation of the status of mainstream
feminism today. Similarly, in their introduction to Catching a Wave editors Rory
Dicker and Alison Piepmeier note that—if nothing else—the idea of a hair-
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pulling, face-clawing generational conflict is certainly capturing the media’s
attention. They note that most popular media representations characterize the
second and third wave of feminism “as confrontational and uncooperative, even
hostile … [T]ypically, the media describes one generation as the victim and the
other as the perpetrator, with frequent role reversals, depending on the cultural
climate. Though there’s no denying that this makes a good story, it’s really just
the latest incarnation of the feminist catfight.”153
Accordingly, the consensus among many third wave feminist writers and
activists is that the problem comes down to a lack of communication between
generations154: young feminists reject what they perceive to be older feminists’
imposing and confining institutions and their battle-weary bitterness, and older
feminists are all but lost when it comes to deciphering new-age girlies who play
dress up, invest millions in consumer capitalism, and call themselves
empowered but couldn’t give a hoot about politics. As one dimensional and
inaccurate as those images are of either generation, those are some of the most
common media images feminists—and all mainstream Americans—receive, and
those are the images central to their (mis)understanding of other generations.
The ostensible solution to this “crisis,” then, is the establishment of a good
rapport between feminists of different ages.155 Baumgardner and Richards, for
instance, lament that “young feminist-minded people often lack … a coherent
declaration that can connect the lives of individual women to the larger history
of our movement,”156 and suggest that young feminists need to work to establish
at least a cognitive connection with feminist legacies.
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To that end, Astrid Henry reconstructs the emergence of wave theory in
feminism, detailing the ways feminists in the late 1960s initially adopted the
“second wave” moniker—and therefore retroactively referred to feminists of the
suffrage movement as the first wave—in order to establish legitimacy for their
movement by claiming and celebrating a historical foundation.157 As Henry
describes it, “In identifying themselves as the second wave, women active in the
women’s liberation movement were able to position themselves within the
longer trajectory of feminism’s history … it legitimized feminism as a serious and
ongoing political struggle with a history.”158 In other words, the wave construct
functions somewhat differently for different generations, in ways that are
particular to their historical moment. Third wave feminists, who grew up with
feminism or the legacy of feminism all around them, use the wave construct to
establish a unique identity via disidentification, and therefore adopt a positivist
view. Second wavers on the other hand, who were by and large deprived of any
historical feminist knowledge, and who likely didn’t know many (or any) living
older feminists due to the forty year expanse between the first and second waves,
resurrected suffragist legacies and created a “wave” identity to forge an active
identification. This identification was expressed according to a romantichistorical model that not only respected but downright idealized the past. For
instance, Shulamith Firestone and Anne Koedt, founders of the New York
Radical Feminists (NYRF) in 1969, declared that they were dedicated to “a
furthering of the militant tradition of the old radical feminist movement,”159 and
christened their 15-person subgroups or “brigades” after pairs of famous
historical feminists—i.e., the Stanton-Anthony Brigade.160
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And yet, while the wave metaphor functioned in different, historically
specific ways, the end result was the same. The very notion of a new wave
connoted evolution, difference, and allowed second wave feminists to position
themselves “at the forefront of something new,” or to “posit themselves as the
vanguard,” even as they simultaneously located themselves within the feminist
trajectory.161 Indeed, terms such as “evolution” and “progress” are major
indicators of Western historicizing, as Euro-American historical narratives are
frequently imbued with modernizing, “civilizing,” and evolutionary impulses:
the desire to compete and win, to improve upon, and to transcend physical
humanity with intellectual superiority. Thus, there was a simultaneous,
contradictory element of positivism within the origins of wave construction,
which perpetuated the historicization of feminism according to a Western
narrative.
Indeed, at the very beginning of the second wave, there was sometimes
unmitigated hostility toward suffragists and early American feminists:
frequently, the mentality was that early feminists achieved nothing beyond
suffrage and minor legislative reform, failing to mobilize around any genuinely
revolutionary agendas. As Henry explains, radical women’s liberationists
thought that nineteenth and early twentieth century “movement had failed
because first-wave feminists had not fought for ‘real emancipation’ but rather
had allowed themselves to be placated by ‘sop.’”162 Moreover, in the next few
years the term “second wave”—beyond signifying continuity in the context
Firestone and Koedt erected—also became a codeword for progress: Henry
writes that it became “tantamount to ‘new’ (and ‘improved’), making the first
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wave analogous with ‘old;’ ‘new’ and ‘old’ are clearly synonyms for good and
bad, radical and conservative, respectively.”163 Just like third wave feminists,
these second wave feminists imagined that they were breathing new life into a
movement that had been dead, or at least dormant, for nearly fifty years between
the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920 and the bestowment of the
magical, spell-breaking kiss by feminists in the late 1960s.164
Henry explains that these two contradictory relationships to first wave
feminism are important simply in that they created a “productive tension… that
emboldened the second wave to see itself as a powerful political movement.”165
However, my analysis of this issue seeks to interrogate why these simultaneous
and contradictory relationships existed in second wave feminism in a way the
third wave has yet to replicate. The implication, I contend, is that constructions
of the second wave (in relation to the first wave) could choose to adopt a positivist
or romantic-historical approach—or both simultaneously, because there was no
necessity to disidentify in order to claim a new feminist identity: not having
known very much about an old feminist identity, a feminist identity was
revolutionary in and of itself. That is, without an older generation directly
preceding them, there could be no conflict. The feminist newcomers of the
second wave didn’t feel obligated to create their own, overtly distinct feminist
identity through direct disavowal of an old one—and even when they did feel
this need, as in case of positivist second wave feminists, they went unchallenged
simply because feminists of the first wave weren’t around to argue.
Thus, it would seem that wave construction is inherently problematic
because it predisposes feminists to embrace a positivist model of relationality
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that—even when the older generation is too far removed, historically, to
protest—causes the perpetuation of ahistorical information and reductive
perspectives. And it might seem, based on this information, that if feminists
consciously opt for a romantic-historical perspective, the wave construction may
be redeemed. However, history is not that simple: the romantic-historical
position likewise carries a host of problems, not the least of which is a different
kind of reductionism and a highly problematic tendency toward racist oversights.
Whereas the positivist position was guilty for reducing past movements
to worthless, monolithically conservative and reformist crusades, the adoption of
a romantic-historical position generally caused the opposite reaction: the past
was idyllically reduced to a blemish-free, supremely radical ideal that was the
archetype for “good” feminism. Henry explains that the romantic-historical
second wave feminists “made a clear distinction between what parts of that past
were to be reclaimed and what parts were to be left aside … [T]hose figures and
theories seen as radical were stressed over those—like much of the later suffrage
movement—that were deemed conservative.”166 For instance, the creation of the
Stanton-Anthony Brigade within the NYRF posited Susan B. Anthony and
Elizabeth Cady Stanton as heroic radicals, when in reality they—Anthony most
especially—became increasingly conservative when and as it suited their
personal agendas. For instance, Henry notes that later historians would generate
critiques of Stanton and Anthony for their “at-times xenophobic and racist
arguments for why white, middle-class women needed the vote” over and above
black men.167
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Furthermore, while both the suffrage movement and the Women’s
Liberation Movement were inspired by corresponding anti-racist movements (i.e.,
abolition and black enfranchisement in the mid to late nineteenth century and
Civil Rights and Black Power in the 1950s-1970s), and while the second wave
used this fact to establish continuity with the first wave, this formulation had a
tendency to erase analyses of the ways race and gender oppression intersected,
causing the issues important to black women to disappear from—or rather never
register on—the feminist radar in both the first wave and much of the
mainstream second wave.168 In the first wave, race and gender were seen as
“separate but equivalent” issues, and Henry notes that this attitude was
uncritically adopted by most white second wave feminists—perhaps because of
their desire to identify with their white feminist foremothers.169 Black women
boldly and steadfastly resisted this dual marginalization within both anti-racist
and feminist movements, generating critiques such as Francis Beal’s theory of
“double jeopardy;” but their critiques were not incorporated into feminist theory
and praxis for many years. Indeed, to this day they are generally not
incorporated in substantive, central ways.170
Henry postulates that part of this marginalization of women of color on
the part of white feminists seems to have been intentional: so eager were white
second wave historians to construct a historical identification with their
foremothers that they totally neglected black feminists of the nineteenth century,
frequently overlooking black women’s enormous contributions to suffrage
movement altogether.171 She explains, “It could be argued that white feminists’
desire to identify with the past manifested itself as a longing to find women who
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mirrored their own race and class perspectives,” and since early second wave
feminism was predominantly white and middle class, accounts of the first wave
were overwhelmingly “whitewashed.”172 Furthermore, this erasure could not
have been due to genuine ignorance because black feminists of the second wave
were writing about their first wave predecessors, such as Harriet Tubman, Ida B.
Wells Barnett, Mary McLeod Bethune, Mary Church Terrell, Sojourner Truth,
and Francis Ellen Watkins Harper, among others.173 The fact is that “[e]ven if
[white feminists] had been aware of the many black women involved in the
earlier movement, it may be that few white women would have looked to black
women as foremothers to their own feminism”—especially because black
feminists have always endeavored to synthesize race and gender whereas white
second wavers were looking for a historical predecessor to an independent
women’s movement.174

~

*

~

These analyses make it exceedingly apparent that the feminist wave
construct is fundamentally reductive and divisive, erecting irreconcilable barriers
between feminist generations. It is essentially unredeemable: while positivist
perspectives encourage an ahistorical perception that refuses to acknowledge
innovative and radical theory of past “waves” in order to claim progress,
evolution, and in effect superiority—and therefore encourage a Western
conceptualization of history—the romantic-historical perspective encourages
idealized representations of historical feminism that fail to generate critiques or
reformist, conservative, or otherwise oppressive/dominative feminists. Although
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in the late 1960s and 1970s second wave feminists were able to strike something
of a balance between (or at least negotiate a simultaneous incorporation of) these
two perspectives due to the historical specificity of extended “dormancy”
between the first and second wave, this is not an option for third wave feminists.
Since the third wave followed the second wave so closely, and because the waves
are therefore directly conflated with mother-daughter generations, the only way
third wavers can forge a unique generational identity from within the wave
construct is to disidentify with second wavers. Moreover, even if the third wave
was able to construct a balance between positivism and romantic-historicism,
they would nonetheless perpetuate the generations-old reductions and
exclusions that necessarily accompany each opposing perspective.
This is not to place responsibility for wave construction solely on the
“third wave” and its proponents; nor is it to minimize the impressive and
innovative work that is undeniably being generated by the third wave. Rather,
my argument is that the wave construct in and of itself is fundamentally flawed.
Accordingly, I suggest that it would behoove young feminists to resolutely resist
wave identification: to take the step that would change and the trajectory of
feminist historicization and thus make way for additional feminist possibility.
Above all, it is crucial to note that both generational perspectives also
cause specifically racist reductions and erasures: positivism, on one hand, erases
progressive woman of color critiques that speak to new-age ideologies in a
stubborn refusal to problemetize holistic disidentifcation. Meanwhile, absolute
romantic-historicism—in a white-dominated movement—leads to the erasure of
black feminist/womanist foremothers with whom racist white feminists cannot,
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or rather refuse to, identify, other than as benevolent, accommodating Mammies
whose theories are astute but assimilatable. Thus, the wave construct can be
understood as a historically and fundamentally racist paradigm that isolates one
mainstream generation from another—only uniting them insofar as they share
whiteness and racism—and persistently alienates black and/or woman of color
feminist discourses. It contributes, in other words, to the continued
historicization of feminism as Western, white, and bourgeois. In the following
chapter, I explore specific ways that the third wave, in its desire to situate itself
as innovative and evolved, perpetrates multiple erasures of U.S. third
world/woman of color theorizing.

65

~TWO~

Pedagogies of the Suppressed:
Excavating the Radical Roots of the Not-so-New Third Wave
“I learned to make my mind large, as the
universe is large, so that there is room for paradoxes.”
-Maxine Hong Kingston175

Consider the following statements:
Feminism needed an elective surgery—a face-lift, a remodeling—
but it also needed an ideological expansion so that it could be
more pertinent to contemporary realities and attractive to younger
activists … [M]ost of all, we wanted a movement that addressed
our races, sexualities, genders, and classes.176

Feminism is the political theory and practice to free all women:
women of color, working-class women, poor women, physically
challenged women, lesbians, old women, as well as white
economically privileged heterosexual women. Anything less than
this is not feminism, but merely female self-aggrandizement.177
The first statement was written in 2004 by “third wave” feminists Vivien Labaton
and Dawn Lundy Martin, in their introduction to The Fire This Time. They
bespeak the a similar need as conveyed by the second passage: that feminism
needs to be an inclusive ideology that centrally locates the issues and makes
room for the multiple realities and oppressions relevant to the lives of all women,
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how ever the category of “woman” is defined—if it can even be neatly defined.
Yet the second passage was written a quarter of a century earlier, first spoken by
Barbara Smith at the 1979 National Women’s Studies Association (NWSA)
conference. The inevitable question this repetition brings to mind is, If feminists in
1979 were talking about, theorizing about, and developing praxis based on intersectional
modes of feminist analyses, what changed over the next twenty-five years that made such
an analysis “new” again?
But the real question is not what changed; it is what was forgotten--what
was erased. With the cresting of the “third wave” in the early nineties—a wave
virtually indistinguishable from “Generation X” feminists—the imperative to
define a new praxis based on disidentification with former feminisms (as analyzed
and explored in the preceding chapter) caused a phenomenon whereby the
majority of self-defined black, U.S. third world, or woman of color feminisms
developed throughout the seventies and eighties by visionaries like Barbara
Smith are for all intents and purposes eliminated from popular feminist
discourse. That is, they were relegated to the periphery of “official” Western
feminist history. While these women and their feminisms are likely to be taught
in women’s studies curricula (albeit frequently only as an appendage or footnote
to “mainstream”—read: white—feminism), in most cases they are not present or
accounted for in contemporary representations of feminism which largely adhere
to exclusively Western discourses. Rather, “new” feminists assimilated the ideas
represented by forgotten feminisms and presented them as something unique,
daring, or just plain superior about the supposed third wave, since that was the
only way they could assert individuality from their literal and figurative feminist
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mothers. The presumption is that the “third wave” is the first feminism to make
contradiction, ambiguity, and ideological expansion/ inclusion a forerunning
feminist focus.
Regardless of mainstream acknowledgement, it is widely recognized
within feminist scholarship that so-called third wave feminism is founded on
black, U.S. third world, and/or woman of color feminist legacies. For instance,
Heywood and Drake explain that “[c]haracterizing the ‘third wave’ as a
movement defined by contradiction is not new… As early as 1981,” with the
publication of Barbara Smith’s Home Girls and followed by the publication of This
Bridge Called My Back two years later, “contradiction was claimed as a
fundamental definitional strategy, a necessary, lived, embodied strategy.”178
They go on to write that these women and their feminisms provided the model
for third wave “language of hybridity that can account for our lives at the
century’s turn;” they cite Gloria Anzaldua’s statement that “we have come to
realize that we are not alone in our struggles nor separate nor autonomous but
that we—white black straight queer female male—are connected and
interdependent.”179 For that matter, Henry brings to the forefront the fact that
U.S. third world women were beginning to identify themselves as the third wave
in the late eighties, although the anthology proclaiming this terminology was
never published due to financial dilemmas at Kitchen Table: Women of Color
Press.180 Henry also explains the “third wave” frequently identifies theories by
U.S. third world feminists “regarding the interlocking nature of identity—that
gender, race, ethnicity, sexuality, and class never function in isolation but always
as interconnected categories of oppression and privilege … as the second wave’s
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most influential and vital lesson;” she notes that for many young feminists,
“critiques of feminism’s racism, its homophobia, and its inattention to other
forms of oppression among women have been at the center of what they have
learned as feminist theory.”181
However, even when influential Black, U.S. third world, and woman of
color feminisms are acknowledged and credited by “third wave” writers, they
are somehow left peripheral to the capital “F” Feminism being unilaterally
critiqued. For the most part, a “unitary model” of feminism is nonetheless
perpetuated because third wave writing presents an image of feminism wherein
“women of color are relegated to the sidelines.”182 As Astrid Henry writes, “Even
when second-wave feminists of color are recognized as foundational to the third
wave, such feminists seem unable to represent feminism itself.”183 The
implication, therefore, is that these ideologies weren’t really part of feminism
until now, and that, by extension, these women must not have really been
feminists.184 Furthermore, the marginalization of black/woman of color feminist
discourse functions to preserve a Western historical narration of privileged-class
feminism.
An unpacking of the U.S. third world feminisms that are the actual
foundations of the “third wave” is therefore necessitated. Accordingly, it
becomes clear that the wave construct must be dismantled for these legacies to be
centrally located in feminist praxis, for they can never be granted their rightful
esteem in a feminism that is situated in an exclusively Western historical
narrative. Broader definitions and more flexible, global conceptualizations of
justice, liberation, and anti-sexism are required.
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Herstory is Powerful:
soul searching, truth-searching, and re-writing feminist
genealogies

Since the inception of North American feminism’s “second wave,” black
women/women of color have been challenging the white feminist status quo
that was classist, racist, homophobic and exclusionary. For instance, feminist
scholar Chela Sandoval notes that Francis Beal and other black
feminists/womanists argued that feminism should be specifically called a “‘white
woman’s movement’ as it insisted on organizing along the binary gender
division male/female alone.”185 They argued that not only did this
conceptualization ignore considerations as to how race, class, and sexuality
implicate particular, unique oppressions that could not be accounted for on a the
single axis of gender oppression alone, but this conceptualization ignored what
women of color have understood for a long time: that additional factors come
into play to “deny comfortable or easy access to any legitimized gender category,
that the interactions between such social classifications produce other, unnamed
gender forms within the social hierarchy.” That is, the categories “man” and
“woman” are historically restricted to specific classes, races, and sexual identities
and have been used as a tool of imperial domination or cultural assimilation. As
a result, not every “female” is necessarily granted access to the ideology of
womanhood, although most are socialized to believe they must conform to rigid
gender identities.186 Yet these bold and important black feminist critiques
frequently fell on deaf ears within the mainstream movement, which—
replicating the devastating insularity of “first wave” reformist feminism—feared
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that any analysis of issues beyond gender would detract from the feminist cause.
As a result, black and U.S. third world feminisms “remained just outside of the
1970s feminist theory, functioning within it—but only as the unimaginable”
within the larger structure of a “‘hegemonic feminist theory.’”187
Theorizing with black, woman of color, and U.S. third world feminist
circles continued to take shape and define new, groundbreaking praxis well into
the 1980s, after the mainstream women’s movement of the 1970s seemed to fade
into introspection and academic seclusion. While this era is often incorporated
under the umbrella of the “second wave,” the fact is that it fits into no tidy
category of the American feminist wave triad: the second wave is generally
identified as having gradually came to a halt by the end of the seventies, whereas
women who engaged in U.S. third world feminisms—most notably Cherrie
Moraga, Audre Lorde, Gloria Anzaldua, Barbara Smith, Maxine Hong Kingston,
and bell hooks—generally did not become vocal until the early eighties. Clearly,
this is yet another flaw in the feminist wave construct at all points in Western
feminist history: according to wave categorizations, U.S. third world feminism
has no place within hegemonic feminist history. Located at the cusp of the
“second wave” and “postfeminism,” U.S. third world/woman of color feminism
is a movement that—according to Western historicization—is displaced from an
era, displaced from the United States feminist context and by from implication
from American feminist legitimacy, and therefore considered outside of the
narrative of Western feminism. The fact that its ranks consist of women of color,
whereas mainstream “waves” are predominantly white, can hardly be
coincidental.
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Indeed, this is not the first time feminists at the cusp of or in between
Western-defined “generations” or “waves” have found themselves displaced
from history: such a displacement is a necessary function of the feminist wave
construct. Henry notes that the wave model “[creates] a chronology in which no
feminism or women’s movement was seen to exist in the period between 1920
and the late 1960s,” and in which no feminisms—for instance that of British
writer Mary Wollstonecraft, who in 1792 penned “A Vindication of the Rights of
Women” or the anti-sexist movement African or Asian cultures—were
acknowledged prior to the start of America’s “first wave” in 1848.188 Accordingly,
feminists who came of age in the late 1970s to mid 1980s consist of the most
recent generation to fall between the feminist cracks. As Henry phrases it, this
generation “must necessarily go missing from feminism’s narrative of its
generational structure”—and they are by no means an accidental casualty, for
they “cannot be a branch on feminism’s family tree if the wave structure and the
family structure are to be mapped onto one another.”189 In other words, if the
“second wave” is to be understood as the “mother” generation and the “third
wave” is to be defined as the “daughter” generations, there is no room in
feminist genealogy for a generation in the middle. Hence, beyond having racist
implications, the erasure of the 1980s generation from feminist historicizing is a
fundamental by-product of wave models; and these two factors, operating
simultaneously, only increase the odds that revolutionary anti-racist
feminisms—especially those articulated by black and brown women—will be
virtually vanished.190
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The revolutionary anti-racist feminism generated in the late seventies and
eighties created what Chela Sandoval calls a new “citizen-subject” which
represented a unique “mobility of identity.”191 Cherrie Moraga writes that she
and her comrades were “women without a line… women who contradict each
other,” and they struggled to negotiate the “seemingly irreconcilable lines—the
class lines, the politically correct line, the daily lines we run down to each other
to keep difference and desire at a distance,” for it is between these lines “that the
truth of our connection lies.”192 These women were defining a feminist culture
and praxis predicated around the realities of their daily lives, their daily
struggles. Above all, they represented what Sandoval terms an “eccentric
coalition” of woman of color feminists who were “‘different kinds of humans,’
new ‘mestizas,’ ‘Woman Warriors’ who live and are gendered, sexed, raced, and
classed ‘between and among’ the lines.”193 They occupied different and
conflicting spaces, “borderlands,” as Anzaldua articulated them, which made
their existences fundamentally contradictory: they navigated the borders
between nations, races, heritages, cultures, religions, histories, sexualities, classes,
and more. And this was the source of their power and unique vision: “We
learned to live with these contradictions,” writes Moraga; “This is the root of our
radicalism.”194 Their mission: “to feel enlivened again in a movement that can …
finally ask the right questions and admit to not having all the answers.”195
Perhaps because, as bell hooks asserts, “[r]ace was the most obvious
difference”196 between feminists and feminist theory, particular emphasis within
U.S. third world and/or woman of color thinking, organizing, and writing was
placed on antiracist critique of American feminism. Black, brown, Latina,
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Chicana, Asian American, and Native American feminists in this era were
determined to build a feminist discourse that accounted for the ways in which
their race situated them in within and made them vulnerable to a specific
category of patriarchal oppression. The fact is, they argued, women are
oppressed in different ways and to different extents, as determined by their
social identities: the identities of race, class, gender, sexuality, nation, and culture
that they claim and/or which are conferred unto them in public and private
spaces within the patriarchy. For instance, Audre Lorde urges that “to imply …
that all women suffer the same oppression simply because we are women, is to
lose sight of the many varied tools of patriarchy. It is to ignore how those tools
are used by women without awareness against each other … For then beyond
sisterhood, is still racism.”197
Yet despite the fact that U.S. third world feminist theorizing “arose to
reinvigorate and refocus the politics and priorities of feminist theory,” they were
not embraced into academic feminist enclaves without reservation: Sandoval
notes that “an uneasy alliance remained” between mainstream white theorizing
and the new vision of the U.S. third world, “between what appeared to be two
different understandings of domination, subordination, and the nature of
effective resistance.”198 Rather than being embraced as a necessary and
fundamental component of feminist theory, the work of these women frequently
was simply “tacked on” to syllabi that by and large reflected hegemonic feminist
discourse.199 Indeed, this is indicative of racist and exclusively Western
historicizing, which resists the incorporation of feminist theory not generated by
the white ruling class. Because mainstream American feminism was unwilling to
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reimagine itself, to envision and implement revolutionary change that would
facilitate meaningful coalition between different women—rather than clinging to
notions of “unity” that in actuality imply reductive homogeneity—it was unable
to wrap its mind around the insights projected by black, brown, Asian, Latina,
Chicana, and Native American women. Thus, those insights were generally
either assimilated into privileged feminist discourse, or remained marginal to
United States feminist history all together.
For instance, mainstream feminists failed to challenge and adjust their
political perspectives that created a singular and myopic understanding of
“womanhood,” of women’s lives and experiences of oppression, and which did
not account for international issues or international notions of oppression,
womanhood, or women’s empowerment. As Alice Chai wrote,
What “feminism” means to women of color is different from what
it means to white women. Because of our collective histories, we
identify more closely with international Third World sisters than
with white feminist women … A global feminism, one that
reaches beyond patriarchal political divisions and national ethnic
borders, can be formulated from a new political perspective.200,201
Black, U.S. third world, and/or women of color feminist discourses determined
to react against and eliminate this ignorance and myopia, by calling out white
feminists for their reductions and erasure and by refusing to participate in a
structure that does not speak to an expanded and inclusive notion of women’s
oppression and empowerment. Moraga declares, “[T]he deepest political tragedy
I have experienced is how with such grace, such blind faith, this commitment to
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women in the feminist movement grew to be exclusive and reactionary. I call my
white sisters on this. I have had enough of this.”202
The conflicts and complications between U.S. third world feminists and
white feminists take on many appearances and variations. One of those is
variations is missionary feminism, a realm populated the “pseudo-liberal” white
women who, as Gloria Anzaldua describes it, “dance to the beat of radical
colored chic” yet “suffer from white women’s burden”—a concept she illustrates
with through a Sufi story: a monkey sees a fish in the water and rushes to rescue
it by carrying it high up into a tree. These are the women who “attempt to talk for
[women of color]—what a presumption! This act is a rape of our tongue and our
acquiescence is a complicity to that rape.”203 As Moraga describes, this
missionary feminism is harrowing to woman of color representation, and does
nothing to enhance their liberation or empowerment. It is counter-productive, for
while “Third World women have become the subject matter of many literary and
artistic endeavors by white women,” they are simultaneously “refused access to
the pen, the publishing house, the galleries, and the classrooms … In leftist
feminist circles we are dealt with as political issues, rather than flesh and blood
human beings.”204 The assumption of this missionary position circumscribes the
agency of women of color to act of their own behalf, to empower themselves, to
be taken seriously as academicians, writers, and theorists. And it effectively
reinscribes white women’s dominance over feminist discourses.
Another variation is the model whereby the oppressed are called on to
educate their oppressors. That is, instead of educating themselves, many white
women have expected black women or women of color to take it upon
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themselves to inform and transform their white colleagues, or they call upon
single, often tokenized representatives of “Black Womanhood” to give an
explanation of their lives that can account for all women of color everywhere. But
in reality this is preposterous: no single voice can ever accurately represent
millions of individuals who cannot be monolithically defined simply by race and
gender. And the expectation that black and brown women will bear the burden
of education and transformation—that they must lay down their bodies to form a
bridge to be trampled over, in order to create a connection between themselves
and the women who would otherwise ignore or oppress them205—is, in the
words of Audre Lorde, “a diversion of energy and a tragic repetition of racist
patriarchal thought.” Paraphrasing Adrienne Rich, Lorde states, “[w]hite
feminists have educated themselves about such an enormous amount over the
past ten year, how come you haven’t also educated yourselves about black
women and the differences between us—white and black—when it is key to our
survival as a movement?”206
Too frequently, an attempt toward meaningful and honest dialogue
between women on the subject of race is interrupted by white women’s guilt,
and their inability to engage in a dialogue that risks making them confront those
feelings of guilt. Narrates Moraga,
I watch the white women shrink before my eyes, losing their
fluidity of argument, of confidence, pause awkwardly at the word,
‘race,’ the word, ‘color.’ The pauses keeping the voices breathless,
the bodies taut, erect—unable to breathe deeply, to laugh, to moan
in despair, to cry in regret… We, Third World women in the room,
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thinking back to square one, again. How can we—this time—not use
our bodies to be thrown over a river of tormented history to bridge the
gap? Barbara said last night: ‘A bridge gets walked over.’ Yes, over
and over again.207
And yet, interracial dialogue about racism is crucial to feminist progress because
although “race,” like “gender,” may be a socially fabricated, imaginary construct,
it is absolutely real in terms of the influence it wields over everyone’s lives. It is an
inextricable reality of the environment into which billions of people across the
globe are born, a reality particularly painted onto the Western landscape for
centuries, although people of color most certainly have a different and more
difficult relationship to it. Indeed, writes Moraga, “Racism affects all of [women’s]
lives, but it is only white women who can ‘afford’ to remain oblivious to these
effects. The rest of us have had it breathing or bleeding down our necks.”208
It is therefore the province of white feminists to acknowledge their white
race privilege and devote their energies toward dismantling these oppressive
structures that divide, yet they too often “deny their privilege in the form of
‘downward mobility,’ or keep it in tact in the form of guilt.”209 Failure to
properly manage guilt or actively attempt to divest of racial privilege—or at very
least make the preliminary effort of acknowledging it—is an obstacle that
impedes progress and obstructs coalition across difference. It hence encumbers
the process of transformation which can only be realized through honest
interrogation of our socialized fears of that which is different from ourselves.
Writes Lorde, “I urge each one of us here to reach down into that deep place of
knowledge inside herself and touch that terror and loathing of any difference that lies
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there. See whose face it wears. Then the personal as the political can begin to
illuminate all our choices.”210
But while antiracist struggle is an integral and fundamental aspect of
black, woman of color, and U.S. third world feminism, it is by no means the sole
or even primary focus. Beyond that, it is about articulating a new form of
consciousness, and a new politics that can account for that consciousness.
Declares Moraga, “It is about physical and psychic struggle. It is about intimacy,
a desire for life between all of us, not settling for less than freedom even in the
most private aspects of our lives. A total vision,” for race alone cannot explain
the totality of any woman’s—indeed any person’s—lived experiences “between
the lines.”211
For instance, as Mirtha Quintanales writes, not all third world women are
women of color, and not all women of color consider themselves third world.
Considerations must also be made as to the politics of “passing”—that is, how
white- or lighter-skinned third world women are socially identified, by choice or
by conferment, as “white” Americans and therefore are stripped of their cultural
and ethnic heritage—as well as to heterosexism, class oppressions and upward
mobility. This includes the upward mobility that often transpires with the
attainment of higher education: for instance, the fact that after graduating from
college and becoming more or less middle class, some black and brown women
may be “more [economically] privileged than many of [their] white, poor and
working-class sisters.”212
Furthermore, this new consciousness, this “total vision” works to the end
of reconceptualizing “not just feminist consciousness but oppositional activity in
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general.” According to Chela Sandoval, U.S. third world feminisms “comprised a
formulation capable of aligning U.S. movements for social justice not only with
each other, but with global movements toward decolonization.”213 Indeed, much
of U.S. third world feminism speaks to international efforts toward liberation
and empowerment: nationalist, anti-imperialist, as well as feminist struggle. And
many women of color feminists strongly connect to the perils and struggles of
women around the globe, with whom they share a common culture, legacy, and
history—with whom they share the specific history of colonization and
imperialism. Having been born in the Caribbean herself, Quintanales writes that
traveling the world, she finds herself “feeling the pain of [her] poor and hardworking sisters—struggling against all odds to stay alive, to live with dignity.
[She] cannot sleep sometimes—haunted by the memories of such allencompassing poverty—the kind of poverty that even poor Americans could not
begin to conceive.”214 The totality of woman of color feminism frequently reflects
the theme that there is no “easy explanation to the conditions [women of
color/third world women] live in,” writes Moraga;
There is nothing easy about a collective cultural history of what
Mitsuye Yamada calls ‘unnatural disasters’: the forced
encampment of Indigenous people on government reservations,
the forced encampment of Japanese American people during
WWII, the forced encampment of our mothers as laborers in
factories/in fields/in our own and other people’s homes as paid
or unpaid slaves.215
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And so, women constructing a new consciousness do so by first
recognizing the imperative for connection between all women and between all
people, within the U.S. and without. That is, they are in many ways writing a
counter-narrative to white Western feminist history, rehistoricizing feminism to
appropriately reflect global, multi-issue liberationist and anti-sexist struggle.
This counter-narrative creates a connection that, as Lorde writes, works toward
the end of creating a community; for “[w]ithout community, there is no
liberation, only the most vulnerable and temporary armistice between an
individual and her oppression.” Yet the crucial distinction is that community
does not mean homogeneity: difference is real, and it provides “a fund of
necessary polarities between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic.”
Neither does difference simply mean advocating tolerance of difference—indeed,
to do so would be the “grossest reformism”—but rather celebrating the strength
difference affords. Failure to “recognize difference as a crucial strength is a
failure to reach beyond the first patriarchal lesson. Divide and conquer, in our
world, must become define and empower.”216
The first step to creating a community, that is, to learning to love each other,
is learning how to love oneself. Self-love requires an understanding and
acceptance of one’s total self, unfractured, unpartioned, and reflecting all the
ambiguities and contradictions and messiness and heartbreak and joy that are
incorporated in the lives of women of color. This is the basis of Gloria
Anzaldua’s development of theory about borders, places Anzaldua defined in
1987 as “a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an
unnatural boundary.”217 In Borderlands/La Frontera, she wrote primarily about the
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physical borderlands—“present whenever two or more cultures edge each other,
where people of different races occupy the same territory, where under, lower,
middle, and upper classes touch, where the space between two individuals
shrink with intimacy.”218 She also wrote about other kinds of borders:
psychological, spiritual, and sexual borderlands that exist in any “state of psychic
unrest,” and borders between cultures, histories, identities, and spirts.219 There
are deep psychological tolls of such a conflicted cultural/territorial/historical
past in terms of negotiating one’s ethnicities, colors, languages, cultures,
sexualities, gender roles, and religions, the result of which is acute inner struggle:
“[c]radled in one culture, sandwiched between two cultures, straddling all three
cultures and their value systems, la mestiza undergoes a struggle of flesh, a
struggle of borders, an inner war.”220
For Anzaldua, the new mestiza consciousness is the mentality that must be
developed in order to survive the psychic unrest of the borderlands, in tact and
in health. The new mestiza consciousness emerges from a psychological
synthesis of the multiple cultures, histories, identities, and languages of a borderdweller, and it is a synthesis by which “the self has added a third element which
is greater than the sum of its severed parts.”221 Explains Anzaldua, “[t]he new
mestiza copes by developing a tolerance for contradictions, a tolerance for
ambiguity. … She learns to juggle cultures. She has a plural personality.”222
It is this plurality, this hybridity, and this will to positively, powerfully
transform oneself for the sake of survival and sisterhood that best characterizes
U.S. third world or woman of color feminisms. This is the faith that these
feminisms fight on behalf of—in Moraga’s words, “the faith of activists”: “I am
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not talking about some lazy faith, where we resign ourselves to the tragic
splittings in out lives with an upward turn of the hands or a vicious beating of
our breasts. I am talking about believing that we have the power to actually
transform our experience, change our lives, save our lives.”223 And this is the true
spirit and devotion to faith that threatens to fall out of feminist cultural and
historical memory, if these legacies are not recognized and memorialized in tact,
as a paramount feminist tradition in an expanded narrative of feminist history.

In Search of Our Mothers’ Voices:
Amnesia, Disavowal, and Feminist Alienation
Astrid Henry notes that in the work of woman of color and U.S. third
world feminism, “we see the very feminism that is now being celebrated as ‘third
wave’: one defined by contradiction, multiplicity, and coalition.” This fact, she
observes, is indicative of the tremendous impact that black, brown, Chicana,
Latina, Asian, and Native American feminists have had on young feminists. Yet,
“[g]iven the third wave’s obvious debts to black and other non-white
feminisms … it does seem puzzling that the very feminism that gave birth to this
wave is not described as its mother” in the mother-daughter rhetoric of the
supposed third wave.224
But based on the feminist history discussed in the last chapter, the “third
wave’s” virtual erasure of its black and brown feminist predecessors is not such a
surprise: as many white “second wave” feminists overlooked the influential
black feminists of the “first wave” in their construction of feminist history, so do
many white and/or mainstream “third wavers” represent the Women’s
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Liberation Movement as not just completely dominated but as primarily
populated by exclusively white women.225 “We are left with a paradox,”
surmises Henry: although theory produced by feminists of color is the veritable
bedrock of “third wave” feminism, young feminists cannot include this theory
and the women who generated it within their portrayal of the “second wave”
“lest they dilute the argument third-wavers make about the limits of the
previous generation. In order to argue for a new, ‘real’ feminism, young
feminists need an old, out-of-touch feminism to whom they can shout ‘get
real.’”226
Significantly, it is not just the so-called third wave itself but also the
mainstream media who, today and always, predictably portrays feminism as a
“white woman’s thing.” Regardless of the fact that many principal writers and
spokeswomen for the new feminist generation are black women, and regardless
of the (largely unrecognized) fact that this wave of feminism was in many ways
launched out of the postfeminist eighties by the Hill-Thomas congressional
hearings which highlighted issues of racism and sexism, the popular media
seems unable “to acknowledge feminism as anything other than a white middleclass movement.” Combined with the mainstream popularity of a few white
reformist feminists—like Roiphe, Wolf, and Paglia—this assumption that
feminism is always white and middle class “has created a fairly whitewashed
representation of the third wave.”227 Thus, the historicization of feminism
continues to be preoccupied with Western notions and white feminist
representations, even if the mainstream is not predominantly white.
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A particular reduction perpetrated by “third wave” feminists, in their
haste to differentiate and disidentify from the “second wave,” is their illinformed rejection of identity politics. Henry defines second wave identity
politics as a theory wherein there is a “relationship between one’s gender, racial,
and class experiences and one’s political interests.”228 Most third wavers
unilaterally reject identity politics on the grounds that they are too restrictive, too
limiting, and therefore too unrealistic to men and women who grow up in a
world where there are no clear divisions between races, sexualities, cultures, and
nations; where the oppressions predicated on these bases are
multiple/simultaneous rather than isolated/cumulative; and where postmodern
theories reveal that such categories of sex, race, and nation are subjective and the
product of social fabrication. Danzy Senna, for instance, writes that
it is not my ‘half-breed’ lipstick-carrying feminist muddle that is
too complicated, but identity politics which are too simplistic,
stuck in the realm of the body, not the realm of belief and
action … Breaking free of identity politics has not resulted in
political apathy, but rather it has given me an awareness of the
complexity and ambiguity of the world we have inherited.229
Meanwhile Mocha Jean Herrup, in another essay from the same anthology,
discuses how she has “moved from identity politics to a new domain of
ambiguity. ‘Accept the ambiguities’ has become my personal mantra.”230 And in
their introduction to Third Wave Agenda, Heywood and Drake—who generally
speaking are the most historically-informed self-defined third wave feminists I
have read in that they clearly and explicitly credit women of color for the
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foundational theory and politics of the “third wave”—write that “[c]ommunities
today have to be imagined on different bases than that of the separation of
identity politics.”231
While the “ideology of individualism” reflects a depoliticized third wave
that is divested from articulating a political community and which ahistorically
applies second wave concepts, it is significant to note the reductive nature of the
perspectives which rebel against identity politics. With the exception of
Heywood and Drake, each of the essays these respective passages are from make
no mention of the politics of ambiguity that already exist in feminism,
specifically in the visionary theories of U.S. third world feminists. The
presumption is that dualism is a revolutionary concept of 1990s feminists, an
epiphany that occurred in isolation from and in reaction to other feminist
generations, eclipsing the fact that feminists have centralized analyses of
multiple and conflicting identities for at least three decades.
Indeed, in her afterword to the anthology in which the first two passages,
from Senna and Herrup, appear, Angela Davis points out that feminists stopped
“playing the either/or game” decades ago, and it was only through this rejection
that some women—specifically black women who initially rejected feminism as
too white and middle class—were able to define a feminism that included their
realities.232 Similarly, in the foreword to this anthology Gloria Steinem indicates
that, contrary to what many of the young contributing writers portray, “a
depolarized, full-circle world view, one that sees and instead of either/or, linking
where there had been ranking,” is an old “feminist specialty.”233
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But moreover, while their critique of the limitations posed by identity
politics may be valid, and while today most feminists organize on more
complicated bases, each of these rejections of identity politics neglect to identify
the crucial role identity politics played in diversifying feminism: in defining
spaces for intersectionality, in validating women’s different experiences and
identities, in proclaiming racial and cultural difference and pride therein, and in
creating communities and community identifications that were vital to many
women who longed for a politics that worked against women’s oppression but
which could not or would not sacrifice other aspects of their identities—race,
class, culture, sexuality. Without the pride, strength, and validation afforded by
these community affiliations, many would-be feminists would feel stranded,
isolated, and alienated from a feminist movement that appeared white, middle
class, straight—and therefore foreign. As Steinem wrote,
Several writers [in To Be Real] assume the goal of identity politics
is division, as if doing away with adjectives would magically
bring a shift in power. In fact, some degree of pride in identity has
been necessary to … empowerment … [T]he goal is not to
perpetuate difference, but to protest the invisibility, suppression, and
political uses of difference.234 (emphasis added)
And without first putting a politics of identity in place, women of color might
never have made the theoretical jump from holistic identity politics to a politics
of ambiguity: the latter is a projection, an expansion, a point along a trajectory
from the former.
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Indeed, identity politics was crucial to the initial articulation of
womanism or black feminism in the 1960s – 1970s feminist movement.
Historically, mainstream (read: white) feminist movements have alienated black
women, whose unique concerns and angers are not justified or explored by white
feminists platforms that “are completely irrelevant to the black struggle.”235 In
this formulation, black women “could only be heard if [their] statements echoed
the sentiments of the dominant discourse.”236 Therefore, it became apparent that
if black women wanted a feminism to speak to their particular situation in White
America, they needed to define it—and define it they did, using concepts like
Francis Beal’s idea of double jeopardy: that is, the reality that black women are
“doubly oppressed,” facing marginalization and subordination on the bases of
race and well as sex. Throughout the history of American social justice
movement, white women have rejected black women for their blackness and
black men have rejected them for their womanness.237 Their resultant status in
American society has historically been “one of the least ascertainable and
definitive of all the forces which make for our civilization” as they remained “an
unknown or unacknowledged factor in both” women’s and black liberation
movement.238 This could only be challenged and changed once black women
took it upon themselves to explicitly define their own statuses, situations, and
identities using the tools of identity politics. As Lorde wrote, “if we do not define
ourselves for ourselves, we will be defined by others.”239 Identity politics
provides the necessary self-definition.
Furthermore, the articulation of identity politics has been crucial to
deconstructing the notion that all women share a common oppression. As Lorde
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has famously written, the implication that all women suffer equally based
exclusively on gender is a denial of the “many varied tools of patriarchy.”240 The
product of racism is that certain problems faced by black women cannot be
shared or necessarily understood by white women: “You fear your children will
grow up to join the patriarchy and testify against you; we fear our children will
be dragged from a car and shot down in the street, and you will turn your backs
upon the reasons they are dying.”241 Hence, identity politics are necessary for
protesting the central tenet of modern feminist that “‘all women are oppressed,’”
a notion that as bell hooks has written implies “that factors like class, race,
religion, sexual preference, etc., do not create a diversity of experience that
defines the extent to which sexism will be an opposing force in the lives of
individual women.”242 This initial protest, and hence identity politics, articulated
the need for a feminist counter-narrative that expanded feminist theory and
history in ways that accounted for realities beyond those of economically
privileged, Western white women.
Even in woman of color feminist theorizing of the late seventies and
eighties—the foundational ideologies of the “third wave”—identity politics are
by no means wholly discarded. While they reject the notion that a single identity
can account for an individual’s existence or politics, and theorize that identities
and politics are based on axes of ambiguous and conflicting identities, they
nonetheless identify the need to organize around different issues that are unique
to different subjectivities. For instance, in the foreword to This Bridge Called My
Back, Toni Cade Bambara insists that she will not align herself with “white
feminist would-be allies” because there “are other ties and visions that bind,
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prior allegiances and priorities that supercede [sic] their invitations to coalesce
on their terms.”243 This does not mean she advocates separatism; rather, this
means the opposite: a feminist coalition cannot succeed unless differences are
validated, acknowledged, and celebrated as undeniable and necessary realities.
In other words, the bridge Bambara wants to create is not necessarily between all
feminists, black and white: it is between radical feminists with like-minded antisexist and anti-racist critiques. It is made specifically for black, brown, and third
world sisters of color to come together across common ideologies, although they
come from different nations, classes, and cultures; and it is open to white women
if and only if they are prepared to divest of white privilege and engage in critical
interrogation of race and racism.
For example, in the preface Moraga balks at the idea of a lesbian
separatist movement because of the way it fails to account for other social
problems, other urgent concerns that feminists must work with and through. She
explains that, at the time of her writing, there have been numerous cases of
discrimination, injury, and even death of black boys due to police brutality in
Boston. Her reaction is thus: “I hear there are some white women in this town
plotting a lesbian revolution. What does this mean about the boy shot in the head
is what I want to know. I am a lesbian. I want a movement that helps me make
sense of the trip from Watertown to Roxbury, from white to Black. I love women
the entire way, beyond a doubt.”244 In other words, identity politics in terms of
understanding differences are still necessary; but they must be expanded to
incorporate numerous identities, none of which are mutually exclusive, so that
inclusive and meaningful—as opposed to reductive and isolationist—coalition can
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be fostered. Comments Moraga, “The lesbian separatist utopia? No thank you,
sisters. I can’t prepare myself a revolutionary packet that makes no sense when I
leave the white suburbs of Watertown, Massachusetts and take the T-line to
Black Roxbury.”245
And today, twenty years after Moraga and Bambara bespoke these need,
Eliza Noh recognizes the necessity for certain identity politics. She poses the
crucial question, “If identity politics represent ‘essentialist,’ and therefore
politically ‘unsophisticated’ tools for making interpersonal connections,
compared to the mechanisms of self-critique implicit in fluid, postmodern
identities, what happens after deconstruction?”246 That is, how can differences be
discussed and worked through, for no matter how socially fabricated they are, it
doesn’t make racism or poverty or misogyny or imperialism or homophobia, or
any other social system of domination, any less painful and tangible to the
people whom it suppresses. As Noh surmises, the fact is that identity politics are
necessary—even today—because “some white women ‘just didn’t get it.’ We
must deconstruct and historicize the reasons for our divergences … In my
opinion, oppositional identity politics continue to be necessary insofar as
intersubjectivity operates purely as an intellectual exercise.”247
In her poem “The Welder,” Moraga writes:
I am a welder.
Not an alchemist.
I am interested in the blend
of common elements to make
a common thing.
No magic here.
Only the heat of my desire to fuse
what I already know exists. Is possible.
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We plead to each other,
we all come from the same rock
we all come from the same rock
ignoring the fact that we bend
at different temperatures
that each of us is malleable
up to a point…248

This poem beautifully illustrates the essential role that identity politics plays in
the U.S. third world feminist formation of coalition across difference. That is,
coalition is good, is necessary, but only that which is created around
acknowledgement of difference. If we insist upon commonality—that “we all
come from the same rock”—we ignore the fact that our imperfect society makes us
different, makes our experience of the world different, and makes different issues
necessary to our survival. We also ignore the fact that there is no universal
“womanhood” that women necessarily share, for biological sex is just as socially
structured as race. But with a little love—“the heat of desire”—we can weld those
differences into a common apparatus that consists of different parts yet functions
together—indeed could not function independently. In other words, a car doesn’t
work with an engine and a frame and wheels that operate simultaneously, but
they are made of different materials, serve different functions, and require
different kinds of maintenance.

~

*

~

Hence, the supposed third wave’s rejection of identity politics not only
further erases their already unacknowledged foundational theory and ideology;
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it reflects a gravely problematic misunderstanding of that foundation. Because of
this misunderstanding within the mainstream third wave, it is of little surprise
that young black and brown women who do explicitly call on U.S. third world
feminist legacies express hesitancy when it comes to accepting or feeling secure
in mainstream feminism, including the “third wave.” Outside of the mainstream
and rejecting the “third wave” identity—and by implication the wave construct
in its totality—these feminists/womanists/female liberationists generally feel no
need to claim an independent feminist identity and therefore don’t need to
disidentify with their mothers.
Especially in Colonize This!: Young Women of Color of Today’s Feminism, a
2002 anthology edited by Daisy Hernandez and Bushra Rehman, there is a
recognizable tendency to closely identify with and create a continuation of
historical black, U.S. third world, and woman of color feminisms. There are new
articulations of borderlands within these works, for instance when Cristina
Tzintzun writes, “I am mixed. I am the colonizer and the colonized, the exploiter
and the exploited. I am confused yet sure. I am a contradiction.”249
Moreover, many of the essays in this collection reflect a highly tangible
feeling of alienation from white feminist history. As Cherrie Moraga notes in her
foreword to the collection, in many selections there is a sense of “profound
disappointment in white feminist theory to truly respond to the specific cultural
and class-constructed conditions of women of color lives.”250 As Rehman and
Hernandez explain in their introduction, “We can’t have someone else defining
our lives or our feminism.”251 Like their feminist of color foremothers, they
perceive an allegiance and connection to women throughout the world; are
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“disgusted by the us-and-them mentality. ‘We’ the liberated Americans must save ‘them’
the oppressed women.”252 Furthermore, Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarashinha
describes her feelings of painful disconnect from white leftist movements due to
the unforgettable and unavoidable colonial legacy,253 and Siobhan Brooks
comments that “[t]hose feminists seemed to deal with abortion as a choice for
middle-class white women. They didn’t deal with the issues of poverty and lack
of education, the realities of infanticide and racism or making abortion accessible
for all women.”254 Others of these women, such as Kahente Horn-Miller, don’t
even identify as feminist: she writes, “I am a strong Kanienkehaka woman, but I
do not consider myself a feminist. Even though many of the early American
feminists were inspired by my culture, my experience has been very different
from that of women in the dominant society and I don’t pretend to understand
feminist theory. By I do understand Kaienerekowa.”255 This examples require
notions and narratives of feminism to be expanded, so that there is room for prowoman and anti-sexist language beyond a singular notion of Western feminism.
Moreover, young woman of color-identified feminists of today bespeak a
devotion to the legacies of their literal mothers, many of whom never claimed
feminism due to the alienation and irrelevancy they perceived in relation to
mainstream, white, middle class second wave feminism. For instance,
Gwendolyn D. Pough writes that even though she grew up without any idea as
to what feminism was, she new first hand what it meant to be a strong woman:
“I had seen strong Black women all my life. My mother was a single parent and
she worked hard to make sure that my sisters and I had the things we needed.
She did not call herself a feminist. But she left an abusive husband and told any
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other Black man who could not act right where the door could hit him.”256
Similarly, Brooks recalls the everyday actions and protests by women in her
neighborhood who fought back against sexual abuse and domestic violence, and
notes, “I doubt any of them would have used the term ‘feminism’ to describe
their actions.”257 And yet, this “everyday feminism” seemed to be missing to
Brooks when she entered collegiate women’s studies classrooms: there “the
women had the theory but not the practice … Then there were the women in
Sunnydale who organized against welfare cuts and drugs in their neighborhoods,
for better housing and daycare, who would never call themselves feminists. They
were more ‘feminist’ in their actions than many of the white women in my
women’s studies classes.”258 Once again, there are multiple languages for and
articulations of anti-sexism and anti-sexist praxis that extend beyond the bounds
of Western feminist historicizing. Understanding this multilingualism, and
busting open the borders of hegemonic ruling class Western feminism, would
expose feminists to more possible expressions of ant-sexism and more effectively
foster an environment in which various anti-sexist activists can engender a global
dialogue.

~

*

~

It is clear that there is much at stake when so-called third wave feminists
disidentify with their maternal generation. Intergenerational disidentification
necessitates the erasure of U.S. third world feminisms—the very ones that are
absolutely foundational to the “third wave”—not only because the historical
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timing of that movement fall outside of feminist-sanctioned waves, but also
because recognizing them as a powerful and influential change agent within
feminism would contaminate the act of disidentification and in effect eliminate
any “third wave” identity. The result of this wave construction, therefore, is
racist historicizing—a tragic if ironic reality for a feminism that wants to be
fundamentally antiracist. Feminist is historicized according to racist and
exclusively Western terms in that women of color are only portrayed as
peripheral and victimized figures within previous feminisms; in that the “third
wave” therefore only recognizes mainstream white feminisms as composing
feminist history; in that black and woman of color theories do not enter into
mainstream recognition unless articulated by a movement that is portrayed as
predominantly white; in that white feminists will not look to feminists of colors
as their foremothers; and in that the media ignores the fact that the “third wave”
is lead by and pioneered on the politics of women of color, and therefore
continues to represent a whitewashed portrayal of feminism. These five effects
act simultaneously, and sustain one another, are indivisible from each other. And
each works in conjunction with the initial wave disidentification to continue to
create disastrous misunderstandings within feminism, leading to an ahistorical
misinterpretation of identity politics and therefore—in a manner that is
extraordinarily counter-productive—perpetuating exclusion and alienation of
black and brown women in the U.S. who cannot and will not divest themselves
of their antiracist, black/U.S. third world feminist legacies.
Indeed, pragmatically speaking, it is not even possible for the “third
wave” of United States feminism to correct these problems. For instance, in The
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Fire This Time Labaton and Martin write that “[y]oung feminists have shed the
media-espoused propaganda about feminists but have taken to heart the
criticism from women of color that the second wave was not racially or sexually
inclusive enough. The addition of the third wave in front of the term feminism,
for them, is a reclamation—a way to be feminist with a notable difference.”259 But,
if they have rejected the propaganda and recognize the woman of color legacies
long in existence, from whom are they reclaiming feminism? If they are only
reasserting and reincorporating historical feminisms, what is there to reclaim?
Where is the “notable difference”?
Moreover, In Third Wave Agenda, Heywood and Drake make every
attempt to forge reconciliation between supposed third wave “difference” and
identification of foundational feminist legacies. They explain that, in the writing
of black, U.S. third world, and woman of color feminists from the late seventies
and eighties, third wavers “seek and find … languages and images that account
for multiplicity and difference, that negotiate contradiction in affirmative ways,
and that give voice to a politics of hybridity and coalition.” Further, they warn
feminists about the long history within feminism of “borrowing from, allying
with, and betraying African American Liberation movements,” and advise that
the province of the third wave is to “work with and through these tensions.”260
Yet, if the notion of a “third wave” is by definition predicated on newness and
difference from previous feminist theorizing, how can a feminism that works
through and in awareness of these legacies and these tensions be a “third wave”?
What does this all mean?
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Quite simply, it means that the “wave” model is fundamentally flawed,
failing to carry out its objectives of coalition and inclusion. And it means that the
“third wave” is essentially a myth, for any appropriate articulation of its legacies
is counterintuitive to and necessary betrays a definitional “third wave.”
This chapter has provided a discussion of the ways wave theory creates
racist reductions and erasures internal to United States feminist historicization.
In the next chapter, I will expand and complicate this issue by introducing an
analysis of the ways wave construction impedes or betrays international feminist
coalition, and indeed ignores any feminism that is not based on Western feminist
conventions.
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~THREE~

Feminism at the Crossroads:
Western Legacies, Transnational Futures, and the Problematics of Exporting
Feminism

“We seek a world in which there is room for many worlds.”
-Subcommander Marcos
Zapatista Army of Liberation (EZLN)261

Whether or not it is adequately recognized, the entity known as third wave
feminism is absolutely and fundamentally predicated on the politics, theories,
and identities constructed by black, women of color, and U.S. third world
feminists of the late 1970s and 1980s. Co-opted, assimilated, or genuinely
embraced, the “third wave” proclaims matters of antiracism, inclusivity,
hybridity, and ambiguity to be the cornerstones of its movement. They are
politics and theories that, as articulated by feminists of color, reflect a strong
allegiance to women outside of the geographical Unites States borders and
dictate a drive toward engaging in transnational feminist dialogue.
Yet conversely, in identifying as the “third wave,” contemporary
feminism assumes a specifically and exclusively Western tradition and heritage:
the term semantically locates itself along a trajectory from the first and second
“wave” American feminist movements. Indeed, the very notion of a third wave
implicitly implies continuity with movements that—as the third wave itself has
taken pains to illustrate—were predominantly (though not monolithically)
classist, racist, and historically imperialist in their interactions with women of
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other cultures and nations. The implication of this is that the mainstream “third
wave” can only imagine Western legacies, and certainly only normalizes Western
traditions, therefore limiting feminist thought to Anglo or Euro-American
cultural and ideological conventions. Other notions of “womanhood,” “gender,”
“resistance,” and other brands of feminism or anti-sexist praxis262 are thus
effectively alienated. This alienation is particularly problematic in today’s global
world, wherein one of the major feminist compulsions is toward transnational
feminism. Insofar as Euro-American feminism is mired in Western cultural and
historical specificity, the imperialist desire to export American feminism is
problematically replicated.
This neo-imperialist exportation is fundamentally opposed to the sacred
connections perceived by U.S. third world feminists to third world women in
other nations, sisters with whom U.S. women of color share, as Alice Chai stated,
“collective histories”—a fact which fosters the desire for a “global feminism” that
extends “beyond patriarchal political divisions.”263 Hence, the notion of a third
wave based upon woman of color traditions is paradoxical in terms of the ability
to engage in egalitarian feminist transnationalism: to the extent that the third
wave assumes and valorizes (even as it simultaneously repudiates) a Western
feminist tradition, can it participate in a genuine international dialogue? In other
words, while I have to this point been interrogating whether a feminism that
calls itself “the third wave” can legitimately accept or proclaim a feminist of
color legacy, I now pose the question: can a feminism that identifies as the
American “third wave” be true to black/woman of color feminist roots?
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Through an analysis of the ways in which the exclusivity of Western
ideological conventions circumscribe feminist possibilities and isolate the “third
wave” from the “third world,” alongside an interrogation of transnational
challenges and problematics, it quickly becomes clear that feminists must
reimagine ways to cross borders in the global world if we are to respect
international difference and preserve feminist integrity.

Escaping the Quagmire of Western Specificity:
Different Issues, New Ways of Thinking, and Identifying Alternate
Feminisms

“Since the first people on earth where nonwhite,” states bell hooks, “it is
unlikely that white women were the first females to rebel against male
domination.”264 Yet when white women launched a feminist movement in the
United States, they failed to look for corresponding women’s empowerment
movements occurring throughout the world. The mentality of privileged white
feminists—who, ignoring the pioneering work of radical working-class, black,
brown, Latina, Chicana, Asian, and Native American women, proclaimed
“ownership” of feminism—has historically been they were the enlightened, the
liberated, so it was their duty to “save” the unfortunate and unliberated women
of the “third world.”265
However, there were and are anti-sexist and women’s movements going
on throughout the world, which have been eclipsed by Western feminism’s266
imperialist worldview. For instance, Werewere Liking, the contemporary West
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African writer, painter, playwright, and director, coined a new term, misovire, to
refer to anti-sexist women. The term seems to be analogous to “African feminist,”
or, as African critic Irene Assiba d’Almeida describes it, “a feminist who, because
of social constraints, must go through various balancing acts to reach her goals
and create new ways of knowing.”267 Refusing to identify as feminist, specifically,
and simultaneously deconstructing conventional notions of race while urging
African unity, Liking invents her own language of anti-sexism: she “champions a
time … when gender differentiation will be irrelevant to discovering the fullness
of what it means to be human.”268 Liking creates a contemporary re-imagination
of what it means to be anti-sexist, and what it means to be an empowered
woman, outside of the Western context.
Certainly, other feminisms and anti-sexist movements or cultures have
existed since antiquity. While patriarchy is regarded as fundamental to Western
society, and by extension often presumed to be the historical norm throughout
the world, women’s empowerment in many cultures is fundamentally built into
the cultural and political structure, making gender equality a given. For instance,
Ifi Amadiume writes about matriarchy and the dual sex system in precolonial
Africa, describing a system of mother-worship wherein women were fully
autonomous and were the agents of economic power. Women shared power
with or held higher power than men, and gender constructs were flexible enough
that no one was confined to a particular restrictive gender role: there was selfdetermination, gender was generally acknowledged as arbitrary, and there was
even a “neuter” construct an individual could choose to adopt.269 Notes
Amadiume, “If self-rule, that is, sovereignty or autonomy, is the ultimate goal of
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social groups, African women achieved this autonomy through their social
institutions of women’s organizations and the Women’s Councils. European
women, it seems, never achieved this in their entire history, as their feminist
scholars … have discovered with bitterness and regret.”270 Furthermore, the
Native American Haudenosaunee (also known as Iroquois) nations modeled an
egalitarian society wherein women and men shared power and ruled according
to consensus. How many American feminists are aware that some of the United
State’s “first” and most influential feminists, such as Lucretia Mott and Matilda
Joslyn Gage, were themselves greatly influenced by the ways of the Mohawk
Nation, who lived in Central New York just a short distance from Gage’s own
home in Fayetteville?271
Furthermore, many feminists—young and old—have expressed
frustration with American feminism in that it fails to acknowledge the
feminisms/women’s empowerment movements of other nations.272 Susan
Muaddi Darraj—a young Arab-American feminist whose work is included in
third wave anthologies like Colonize This! and Catching the Wave—writes about
the ways American feminism ignores the long and active history of Arab
women’s movements. She writes that “it comes as a surprise to many Western
women and Western feminists to learn that there is, and has been, a strong Arab
feminist movement in the Middle East as least since the beginning of the
twentieth century.”273 Since feminists in the U.S. tend to believe in imperialist
fantasies about women in the Middle East—silent, abused, and helplessly veiled
or mysterious, provocative harem treasures—such a thing as Arab feminism is
generally displaced from the realm of Western feminist possibility.
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Indeed, Darraj writes that American feminist movement “seems not to
understand Arab women’s brand of women’s rights,” and are often unable to
understand that “there was no need to educate Arab women about feminism,
because it already exists in the Middle East and among Arab American women—
and it has already been defined and has a long, controversial history.”274 She
furthermore notes that, aside from being unaware that there is an Arab feminist
movement, many American feminists find it “incomprehensible … that Arab
women could have independently developed a feminist consciousness”: insofar
as the Eurocentric worldview presumes that feminism is only indigenous to the
Western world, the corresponding assumption is that feminisms that have arisen
in the third world represent imitations of Euro-American feminism.275
However, women’s empowerment is by no means a Western invention.
Feminism in the third world, like U.S. third world feminism, is predicated on
completely different theory and philosophy, organizes around different issues,
and thus has a totally different developmental history than Western feminism.
Drawing from the work of Chilla Bulbeck in her book Re-Orienting Western
Feminisms: Women’s Diversity in a Postcolonial World, Darraj explains this point
specifically. She states that while Western feminism has been influenced by
Cartesian philosophy, incorporating the emphasis on “‘individual freedoms—of
thought, to acquire property and so on’ from the theories and forces of
democracy, capitalism, and secularization,” Arab and third world feminism on
the other hand “is reluctant to prioritize the self and the individual above all.”
Due to uniquely third world issues like widespread national poverty,
neocolonialism, and—in Palestine specifically—opposition to Israeli occupation,
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Western feminist agendas toward “individual wealth and personal success have
been generally replaced by nationalisitic aims and attempts to ensure family
survival and progress.” 276
Understandably, this entirely different feminist context causes third
world feminists in the United States—young and old alike—to feel alienated by
traditional Western conceptions of feminism: white, middle-class women who
were eager for financial independence and personal economic power. For
instance, Darraj wonders, “how did Betty Freidan’s ‘feminine mystique’ relate to
my mother, who was a housewife for many years, but who could also claim the
roles of account manager and bookkeeper for our family business…?”277 That is,
how applicable are Western feminisms to the women in other cultures?
Simply put, mainstream Western feminist theories are generally not
applicable to anyone outside of the materially privileged white sphere. Indeed,
feminisms arise outside of the West due to the presence of “gender-specific
issues” that are unique to Eastern and third world nations. Darraj notes that third
world feminists organize around issues such as female genital mutilation (FGM),
veiling, and other such issues that are sensationalized by Western imperialist
fantasies, but more so focus on everyday issues like interpersonal and sexual
violence, the feminization of poverty, availability of clean water and nutritious
foods, healthcare, and so on. 278 Moreover, there is a crucial link between anticolonial nationalism and feminism in Arab and other third world nations:
feminist movement is habitually conflated with or grown out of anti-colonialism,
and feminist agendas often include nationalist objectives—a fact which may
cause feminism to be unrecognizable as an independent movement to
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cultural/national outsiders. As Darraj explains, “[Arab] Women’s organizing has
not always been widely recognized as feminist,” and especially early on was a
sort of “‘invisble feminism.’”279
However, this feminist-nationalist link is frequently uneasy: patriarchal
powers that rule Arab countries and lead nationalist movements often accuse
feminist politics of being anti-religious, Western, or influenced by imperialism—
all seriously contested issues within a movement that is struggling to reclaim
independence from the West, and often seek out a specifically male-identified
self-determination. Articulates Darraj, “Arab feminism was beginning to be
articulated while the Arab world was still under Western colonial rule, and,
therefore, the feminist perspective has always run the risk of being dismissed as
antinationalist or antireligious.”280 That is, as third world men seek to reassert
their masculine power after being historically emasculated by Western
colonialism, feminism—blamed as an imperial influence that threatens the reestablishment of patriarchal dominance through indigenous culture and
religion—becomes easily demonized. People in third world nations who fight for
self-determination of all people—women and men, feminist and nationalist
liberation—are therefore specifically embattled.281 This issue of anti-colonialism,
along with concerns over the daily survival and safety of impoverish women,
children, and men—for nationalist feminists generally are not separatist in their
political and theoretical objectives—is what defines third world feminism in
general and Arab feminism in particular. It is also what differentiates these
feminisms from imperialist, privileged-class hegemonic white feminism—and
what align it with black and women of color/U.S. third world feminism.
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The bottom line is that women will define different feminist praxes as
made manifest by their specific national, historical, cultural, political, economic,
(neo)colonial, and geographical landscapes. Elisha Maria Miranda is another
young feminist writer and contributor to “third wave” collections who discusses
intersections between feminism, globalism, and neocolonialism. In her powerful
essay “A Baptism by Fire: Vieques, Puerto Rico,” she encounters issues of
genocide, patriarchy, forced sterilization, and control of women’s bodies as
perpetrated by Unites States neocolonial powers. Miranda focuses on recent
Puerto Rican history, in particular on the U.S. military’s enforced evacuation of
the small island, Vieques, for Navy weapons testing. From 1941 to 2003, the U.S.
Navy regularly conducted military exercises, firing cannons, missiles, napalm
bombs, and shells with depleted uranium—most of which are not recovered—in
effect destroying the island’s natural ecosystems and releasing dangerous toxins
that are connected to disproportionate rates of cancer, lupus, thyroid problems,
and asthma among inhabitants of the island.282 Having denied Puerto Rican
statehood in 1952 and instead establishing them as a commonwealth—a status
which excused the U.S. from required reporting to the United Nations regarding
its relationship with the island but which was only technically different from the
former status as a colony—the U.S. also enacted enforced evacuation of
inhabitants from the island, despite tremendous revolutionary resistance; often,
dislocation was not reimbursed.283 This, nationalist resisters declared, was de
facto genocide: it represented “the deliberate physical or cultural destruction of a
nationality.”284
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And this, as Miranda makes clear, is an issue that feminists must take up.
Along with the implications for universal liberation—men and women—this
patriarchal colonialism has serious implications regarding oppression of women
and control of women’s bodies. Miranda explains that “the regulation of
women’s bodies is critical to any colonial or imperialist effort that seeks to
eradicate the cultural and national identity of a people.” She is referring here to
enforced sterilization of women and enforced use of birth control, methods
which reduce population and are conducive to population control but is “more
acceptable than lining people up and gunning them down. . . As a result, Puerto
Rican women have the world’s highest sterilization rate.”285 This de facto
genocide by sterilization replicated the atrocities perpetrated by the American
government on Native American and black women, throughout the late
nineteenth-early twentieth century Eugenics movement and lasting through the
1970s. Furthermore, Miranda explains that there is a “double burden” implicit to
“being women and being colonial subjects”: countless women in Puerto Rico
have been brutally raped by U.S. soldiers—especially intoxicated ones—so often
that many U.S. soldiers in Vieques are now confined to their military base.286
It is clear that in order to engage with—indeed to recognize—these
international women’s/liberationist issues, American feminists are required to
divest of their Western perspectives. As long as Western feminists turn a blind
eye to “issues of race, nation, and gender in contemporary neocolonialism,”287 as
hooks has written, they are in effect condoning imperialist powers and ignoring
the voices of women and men who articulate revolutionary, holistic liberationist
agendas. How, for instance, are Western feminists to understand the crucial issue
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of state-sanctioned genocide through forced sterilization if their preoccupation
resides with access to abortion? While contemporary pro-choice movement
defines itself as fighting for women’s self-determination and total freedom of
choice, and is careful to include access to fair and equal healthcare, freedom from
forced sterilization, as well as birth control and safe and accessible abortion for
all women, most writing, press, and legislative action by pro-life feminist
agencies focus on the abortion aspect. Although this is understandable to the
extent that abortion is currently the most controversial and imperiled issue,
under violent attack by the conservative religious right, the effect is nonetheless
that other issues—especially international issues that are related to imperialism,
globalism, and the policing of poor, woman of color bodies—are generally
eclipsed in Western feminist rhetoric.
To the extent that Euro-American feminism is mired in Western
ideological conventions, alternate and more highly liberating ways of thinking
and being feminist are precluded. This is frequently self-defeating insofar as
Western feminists cannot escape the thought patterns of the very structure that
oppresses them: that is, even as they struggle to be free of patriarchy, they still
tend to replicate the ways of thinking with which patriarchy has indoctrinated
them. For instance, in her discussion of the history of matriarchal civilizations in
pre-colonial Africa, Ifi Amadiume suggests that Western Marxist and socialist
feminists align themselves along class lines—proletariat versus bourgeoisie—
because their lack of matriarchal history renders them unable to imagine
“oppositional systems to patriarchy.”288 Further, she notes that many Western
feminists take issue with the traditional African ideology that a woman’s power
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is based on motherhood and reproduction, because in a patriarchal system—
unlike in a matriarchy—motherhood is associated with confinement and
domestic enslavement. In addition to demonstrating an isolated and limited
perspective, this protest by Western feminists reveals ethnocentric historicizing:
assuming their social situation is universal, they problematically attempt to
interpret and understand African women’s histories and experiences. 289
Indeed, Audre Lorde discusses how the historical predominance of
European conventions has developed a specific value system in Western society,
a certain way of experiencing and interacting with the world, which replicates
patterns of dominance even with ostensible liberation movements like feminism.
As a result, even the resistance to Western patriarchal oppression is conducted
from a Westernized perspective, using Western concepts and ideals.290 This is
what she was referring to when she wrote the now-famous lines, The master’s
tools will never dismantle the master’s house. Until feminists can think outside the
patriarchal box and come into other ways of feeling, knowing and relating,
patriarchy and imperialism will be maintained.
Abandoning Western specificity, therefore, requires adopting new ways
of thinking and feeling. One such way, as Lorde has discussed, involves
developing an understanding an appreciation of the erotic, and learning how to
use erotic power. But by the idea of “the erotic,” Lorde is not referring to
Westernized, patriarchal constructions of erotica as occupying only the physical
sphere, as purely sexual and usually pornographic, obscene and/or dominative.
Rather, she is referring to the erotic in its entirety, mind and body: it functions
emotionally, politically, spiritually, psychologically, physically, and sexually, for

110

to be a whole person the mind must never be separated from the body as it too
often is in masochist patriarchal conceptualizations. While the Western capitalist
system is predicated upon profit or physical need, “to the exclusion of the
psychic and emotional components of that need,” the erotic—expressed in poetry,
intimacy, dance, or physical work—centralizes all human need, and defines
possibilities for wholeness and humanity. 291 The erotic in this sense is “a
measure between the beginnings of our sense of self and the chaos of our
strongest feelings;” it is a “well of replenishing and provocative force to the
woman who does not fear its revelation, nor succumb to the belief that sensation
is enough.”292 And it brings us into touch with our deepest selves, and with each
other. Through this, we gain control over our physical and mental experiences
and have heightened power “[f]or as we begin to recognize our deepest feelings,
we begin to give up … being satisfied with suffering and self-negation, and with
the numbness which so often seems like the only alternative.”293 It is the creative
energy, innately female, dark, and chaotic, that pervades every aspect of our
lives and allows us to actively empower ourselves. And since it is so deeply a
part of our nature, it is ultimately essential to knowledge, for the erotic is what
forms the bridge between the spiritual and the political.294
Such new conceptualizations of resistance against patriarchal and
imperialist forces—means that are decidedly outside of the Western status quo—
are frequently articulated by feminists of color/U.S. third world feminists, both
young and old. One way young feminists are redefining resistance is through
incorporating traditional nationalist notions of self-defense: violence in resistance
not only to direct interpersonal abuse, but also in response to institutionalized
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violence. In her essay “Kicking Ass,” Veena Cabreros-Sudd discusses violence as
a human reaction to daily humiliation and oppression, one that can be
incorporated into our daily lives and utilized as an act of resistance that has the
potential to empower people. She explains that “[u]ltimately, our minor
rebellions”—acts like “the hitting back; the spitting in a boss’ coffee; the ugly
contortions of our loud, angry, cuss-ridden mouths”—“make the count less
unequal” for persons who would be silenced, used, or obliterated by the racist,
capitalist, patriarchal social order. 295
Importantly, Cabreros-Sud notes that this violent self-defense—a tactic
which strongly resonates with accounts of African slave resistance on American
plantations—is a tradition of the third world, and of women of color in particular,
and indeed may come with the territory—“A Third World heirloom.”296
Identifying as a half Indian, half Filipina, lesbian woman, she declares that “[t]o
be young, brown, female, and free is about violent contradictions,” and talks
about growing up with the legacy of colonial domination very much alive and
very intensely tangible.297 Having been raised by a mother who was tortured by
Japanese soldiers in World War II, and a father who grew up as a subject of the
British empire, she recounts experiencing “a childhood sans soft-focus innocence,
minus the inculcated belief that adults will not poke, prick, and fuck you
over.”298 For that reason, violent self-defense is part of daily life, part of fighting
tooth and nail for survival. “Fight, fight, don’t ever not fight, was our motto,”
explains Cabreros-Sud; for “[b]eing a colonial, a slave, a survivor—or the
progeny of one—is not easily forgotten.”299 Armed with the knowledge that
society will not step in to protect you, she notes that third world resisters have
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long incorporated violent self-defense into their resistance toolbox. For instance,
she recounts the tactics of a woman’s group in Bengal, India who, in reaction to
an epidemic of rape in women’s-only train cars, took to carrying baseball bats
and beating up any man who tried to enter the women’s section.300
And, she notes that the absence of this resistance—as a tradition for
women of color—is a major flaw in Western feminism. Cabreros-Sud aptly
critiques the white academic feminists who are opposed to violence, who react
scornfully her to ideas of resistance and who, implicitly, are saying “1) I’m
educated and you’re not, 2) I’m upper class and you’re not, and 3) I’m a feminist
and you’re not (since [their] brand of feminism is equated with nonviolent moont-uterus symbiosis).”301 Cabreros-Sud powerfully rejects the “moral
straightjackets”302 offered up by white American feminism—and generates a
crucial criticism of the hypocrisy inherent in claiming a nonviolent ethic while
being complicit in a social system that is irrevocably and innately violent:
through neocolonialism, imperialism, institutionalized racism, or simple
complacency. She articulates,
there’s a popular illusion that ‘violence’ is limited only to the
physical, the actual contact of skin on skin. What about the daily
devastation of poverty, the lack of child care, the shortage of clean
air, the sight of children going without—and one’s own active or
passive participation in those devastating institutions? If Jane Six
Pack hits you, she’s a lower-class bitch. If Jane Six Pack sits in her
air-conditioned stockbroker suite investing in Latin America, it’s
affirmative action.303
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She is here referring to the undeniable presence of institutionalized violence: the
fact that violence is part of life in racist, homophobic, capitalist, patriarchal
society, and so violence is an appropriate, justified, and arguably necessary
expression of resistance. This is yet another articulation of anti-sexist resistance:
that is, it involves using the master’s tools, selectively and smartly, to preserve
survival and begin articulating an agenda for revolution and resistance.
Miranda similarly discusses institutionalized violence in the conclusion to
her article about the Vieques atrocities. She remarks upon the daily terrorism
confronted by people across America, but which is invisible to the relatively
privileged masses, falls under the radar of federal concern. She notes that after
the horrific terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, “[m]any Americans were both
horrified and surprised that we were not safe on our own soil. Yet for those of us
who deal with police brutality, racial hatred, violence against women and queer
people, religious violence, immigrant bashing, and the criminalization of young
people of color, terrorism is embedded into the fabric of daily lives.”304 While she
makes it very clear that it is not her intention to minimize the severity of the 9/11
attacks, she notes that the country is not as safe as many people would like to
think—and that the daily, state-sanctioned violence that falls under the radar is
most often against the most socially disempowered people.
Ultimately, incorporating third world, woman of color expression of
resistance into feminism would, as Cabreros-Sud writes, “go beyond tame-able,
controllable, mass consumable, and ultimately non-threatening feminism;” it
would, in other words, bring Western feminist activism to a new, deeper, truer,
and more effective level.305 This does not mean unprovoked violence or all-out
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war, and as Cabreros-Sudd explains, this use of violence as resistance “is more a
question or a series of inquiries into how we can incorporate our daily
resistances … to create an opening, a space where ‘we’ are allowed our multiple
forms of daily resistance.”306 Rage translated into acts of daily resistance can
become “the blueprints for the very physical and very tangible reappropriation
of our skin, outside, inside, everywhere, and in every way that is ours and ours
alone.”307 By expanding what feminist activism means, by incorporating
resistance strategies from outside the Western context, we not only expand our
feminist vision and make it more inclusive: we identify new possibilities for
transformation, revolution, and holistic liberation that are necessarily absent
from dominative, homophobic, racist and patriarchal Western society.
To be sure, disengagement from an exclusively Western context affords
an enormous amount of new possibilities, new clarity, new ways to imagine the
world and one’s participation within it. One excellent way to demonstrate this is
through the discourse of hip hop feminism. While this feminism—sometimes
included or assimilated into the third wave, other times standing outside it—
importantly locates itself along a trajectory from black feminism/womanism and
usually bespeaks a firm allegiance to its foremothers, it seems that the
perspective is at times stuck in a Westernized worldview. Some of the ideological
conflicts and contradictions hip hop feminists grapple with could be alleviated
through a divestment of Western conventions—which they have, of course, been
born and raised within as children in America—by unearthing and exploring
deeper roots: African conceptions of gender, sexuality, and power. Of course, this
is not to say that all feminists should not explore other ways of thinking and
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knowing outside of Western notions: we most certainly should. But hip hop
feminists in particular, insofar as they privilege a connection to their histories,
could find new answers to their questions by re-learning African cultural
histories of which they (and all Western students) have been largely deprived
due to ethnocentric American educational curricula.

Re-Writing History, Re-Learning Identity:
Gender, power, and Hip Hop Feminism Removed from the Western
Context

One of the issues that has been problematic for black women in America
throughout all of United States history is the negotiation of black women’s place
in conventional Western notions of womanhood. Hazel Carby, in her book
Reconstructing Womanhood, discusses the implication of black women historically
being excluded from the traditional (read: white and Western) notions of
femininity and womanhood. Citing the four “cardinal virtues” of womanhood—
piety, purity, domesticity, and submissiveness—Carby explains that white
women in the antebellum South judged themselves, each other, and were judged
by their husbands according to how well they lived up to these standards which
essentially defined “the cult of true womanhood.”308 These qualities literally
constituted popular notions of womanhood; a woman’s status as woman was
predicated according to how well she embodied these traits. She was to be soft,
gentle, and delicate in appearance; entirely domestic, with no independent sex
drive but a devotion to motherhood, wifehood, and housekeeping; and only
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display her sexuality in order to discreetly allure men: that is, “[s]exuality can be
used to tempt but must be placed within a shell of modesty, meekness; in other
words, it must be repressed”—and it must only be used in the service of her
husband’s needs and desires.309
However, Carby explains that these standards of the cult of true
womanhood were essentially antithetical to popular, stereotypical
representations of black womanhood. While “women” were to be of a fair and
fragile constitution, a “good” black woman—as a slave—was required to be
strong, hardy, and resilient.310 While virtue, especially sexual chastity, was the
number one indicator of “womanhood,” black women were stereotyped as
raunchy, loose, and overtly sexual. In antebellum representations of black
women, “charm” was associated not with modest temptation but with “the dark
forces of evil and magic,” and black female sexuality was associated with taboo
sexual practice.311 In fact, Carby notes that the slave master was not even
considered accountable for his sexual relations—which were habitually in the
form of brutal rape, violent intimidation, or otherwise nonconsensual sex—with
black female slaves because he was simply “prey to the rampant sexuality” of
black seductresses; indeed, the black woman was the threat, for she imperiled
“the conjugal sanctity of the white mistress.”312 Hence, black female slaves were
not, could not be considered “women” according to this cult of true womanhood.
Women, by this definition, were necessarily white, wealthy, and heterosexual.
Excluding other females from this category therefore denied them equal
humanity in the Western context, and justified enslavement, abuse,
dehumanization, and disenfranchisement.
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Black feminists, and today hip hop feminists, have often interrogated this
issue and theorized different ways that black women have historically
interrupted or assimilated the cult of true womanhood in order to escape this
dehumanization. One common reaction to the fact that black women’s
(stereotypical) sexuality has been wielded as a weapon against them—excluding
them from social privilege, excusing physical and sexual torment, rape and abuse
at the hands of masters and oppressors, and justifying every atrocity committed
upon their bodies, minds, and families—has been for black women to suppress
their sexualities in order to prevent exploitation at the hands of others. That is,
they have sought induction into the “cult of true womanhood” via what hip hop
feminist scholar Gwendolyn Pough, citing Darlene Clark Hines, refers to as a
“culture of dissemblance”: “the cloak of silence that Black women have used to
cover any semblance of a sexual identity.”313 By keeping sexuality a private
matter, never mentioned in public, black women from emancipation on have
endeavored to avoid and actively dispel the oppressive myths and stereotypes
surrounding their images. Pough discusses that this was especially true for
African American clubwomen of the abolition era. These women were
committed to “uplifting the race,” and were “politically linked… to crucial
progressive causes”: they demonstrated their “dedication to a tradition of
struggle” through the production literature and social outreach projects, and
they attempted to subvert dominant notions and negative stereotypes associated
with black womanhood by offering an alternative spectacle.314
However, while this was a successful tactic insofar as it “brought wreck
to commonly held beliefs not only about Black women’s capabilities but also
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about the proper place in the public sphere for women in general,” it also made
them eager to “[carry] themselves with the utmost respectability and [subscribe]
to middle-class virtues of womanhood” 315—notions that were repressive,
patriarchal, bourgeois, and the creation of an exclusively European context. It
furthermore created a classist discourse wherein well-to-do, upwardly mobile,
and educated black women and men were considered the only members of the
population fit to publicly represent the entirety of black America—they were the
“talented tenth” of the population, as W.E.B. Du Bois referred to them.316 Pough
notes that this culture of dissemblance led to what Hazel Carby has termed the
“policing of the Black woman’s body”: not only did they suppress their own
sexualities but they were determined to control other black women’s public
images that might threaten “the establishment of a respectable urban black
middle class.”317
Another way black women have historically endeavored to deconstruct
stereotyped notions of black womanhood is by creating a new spectacle, one that
features a sexually empowered figure. Pough has noted that Blues women in
particular created this “counterimage,” one which competed with and disrupted
the other dominant notions of black womanhood—the diametrically opposed
images of the asexual mammy and the hypersexual, morally “loose” black
seductress. According to Pough, blues women deployed their lyrics to redefine
black women’s sexuality in four ways: “by (1) publicly claiming that they indeed
had sexuality, (2) blurring the lines of sexuality by claiming female dominance
and in some cases lesbianism, (3) laying claim to female desire, and (4)
disrupting popular and classed notions of love and sexuality.”318 As the
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mainstream popularity of blues music brought these messages and
representations to a large audience, each of these points crucially affected the
dominant discourse. Through explicitly sexual lyrics that embraced black
women’s erotic desire, blues women worked against the culture of dissemblance,
and by singing specifically about poor and working-class women and their
sexualities, blues women redefined popular public notions of black womanhood.
Pough furthermore notes that the poor or working class origins of blues women
“complicated the very classed notions surrounding who was best suited to
represent the race”319: while the clubwomen subscribed to the notion that only
the most upwardly mobile, conventionally respectable (according to Western
standards), and in other words assimilated black women and men should
publicly represent the race, blues women represented a broader, more realistic,
less repressed image of black America.
It is strange, however, that while hip hop feminists eulogize blues women
for their brazen, empowered sexuality, they are hesitant to respond likewise
toward today’s incarnation of blues mamas: hip hop women. Indeed, the most
embattled issue among hip hop feminists is how to handle sexism, misogyny,
and the commodification, exploitation, and explicit sexualization of women’s
bodies in rap lyrics and videos. While female emcees like MC Lyte, Salt N Peppa,
and especially Queen Latifah are lauded for their integrity, strength, talent,
power, and for demanding respect and maintaining independence, emcees like
Lil’ Kim and Foxy Brown are often considered hypersexual, commercialized, and
self-effacing. Although some scholars and writers are inclined to give sexy
femme fatale rappers like Lil’ Kim and Foxy Brown the benefit of the doubt on
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the grounds that they—unlike voiceless, powerless, bikini-clad “video hos”—are
using their bold lyrics, unadulterated desire, and unashamed, aggressive
sexualities to continue the tradition of spectacle-production in order to subvert
and deconstruct stereotypes, many hip hop feminists are not so willing.
For instance, in an epistolary exchange with sister hip hop feminist Tara
Roberts, Eisa Nefertari Ulen suggests that figures like Lil’ Kim represent the pain
and latent power of black women through centuries of abuse and vilification,
writing that they are the “field hand jezebel twisted into millennial ho.’”320
Similarly, Gwendolyn Pough asserts that by defiantly embracing and celebrating
black women’s sexualities and assertiveness, Kim, Foxy, and other such rappers
create a certain degree of agency. By fiercely claiming the label “bitch” and
through their lyrics, they “offer Black women a chance to face old demons and
not let the stereotypes of slavery inform or control their lives … [T]he lyrics of
these women rappers offer Black women a chance to be proud of—and indeed
flaunt—their sexuality.”321 For that matter, Queen Latifah herself refused to
chastise Kim in the face of public pressure to do so because she respects Kim’s
sexual empowerment and self-determination. She explains, “we’ve all got our
shit in the closet, so who am I to act holier than thou? Somebody is finally saying
it in plan English: … If he’s gonna get what he wants then I’m gonna get what I
want. And these are not unlike things I say myself.”322
On the other hand, however, many hip hop feminists contend that this
sexual power is problematic and essentially flawed; reactions to the likes of Lil’
Kim and Foxy Brown from these writers run the gamut from pity for the
misguided little girl, to resentment and repressed envy of the pampered,
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materialistic sex kitten. Ayana Bird, for instance, concedes that Kim possesses
agency in that she “not only refuses to shy away from the male gaze, she openly
preens for the male gaze while controlling it;” but takes issue with Kim’s
demand for cash and clothes in repayment for sex.323 According to Byrd, this
commercialization of sex and assimilation into the objectifying male gaze—that is,
the fact that Kim intentionally participates in male sexual fantasies—subverts
any potential agency. She poses the question, “what kind of transgressiveness is
Kim enacting when she performs a femininity that mimics misogynistic
patriarchal desire?”324 Likewise, in an Essence article called “to Kim, with Love,”
Akissi Britton refutes Kim’s self-proclaimed feminism based on audacious pussypower aesthetics. She writes, “Feminism is about embracing our power without
reducing it to what’s between our legs. And this so-called pussy power that you
portray, the literal or figurative use of what’s between your legs to get what you
want, completely defeats this.”325 While Kim uses her lyrics to flip the script on
misogyny, reclaiming the word “bitch” and in fact designating herself the
“Queen Bitch,” Britton refutes this reclamation. She writes, “No matter how you
define it, Kim, a bitch is a bitch. And sex equals money equals power is not a
feminist principle.”326
Indeed, in addition to being wary of female emcee hypersexualization,
many hip hop feminist writers take particular issue with commodification of sex.
Tara Roberts, in the epistolary exchange with Eisa Nefertari-Ulen, complains that
the commercialization of rap music has “concocted a fantasy world of Gucci
shoes, diamond bracelets, Lexus SUVs, and sex, with no spiritual
consciousness … It’s a modern day Babylon that we are feeding, and I can’t get
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down like that no more.”327 In her book When Chickenheads Come Home to Roost:
My Life as a Hip Hop Feminist, Joan Morgan similarly protests the “punanny-forsale materialism” that has made Foxy Brown and Lil’ Kim such phenomenal
commercial successes. She declares Foxy and Kim to be “the official chickenhead
patron saints” and writes that, “[u]nlike MC Lyte, Queen Latifah, Salt N Peppa,
or Yo Yo, Kim and Foxy are hardly examples of Afro-femme regality, refined
sensuality, or womanist strength. These baby-girls … have the lyrical personas of
hyper-sexed, couture-clad hoochie mamas.”328 While Morgan concedes that to a
certain extent, “trickin’”—or trading sex for cash, designer clothes, expensive
beauty maintenance, and diamond jewelry—may be an intelligent business move
in a capitalist system with few opportunities for young, urban women of color,
and admits to “chickenhead envy” over the fact that these supposedly ambitiondevoid beauties get all the goodies and all the hottest, richest men, she assures
herself and her professional, educated, upwardly-mobile sisters that “chickens”
lose in the end: wealthy, eligible “black Prince Charmings” are few and far in
between; the married ones refuse to commit and quickly lose interest; and
“punanny power’’ and beauty depreciates with age.329 Displaying an absolute
misunderstanding of the idea of erotic power, at least in the sense that Audre
Lorde theorized it, Morgan concludes that “the ultimate truth” about erotic
power is “that it’s easily replaceable, inexhaustible in supply, and quite frankly,
common … Women who value their erotic power over everything else stand to
do some serious damage to their self-esteem.”330
However, the bottom line is that each of these reactions—both the
positive and the negative—is predicated on Western and bourgeois notions of
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womanhood, sexuality, and power. Even as the skeptics celebrate the regality of
African Queen-representations and problemetize explicit, bought-and-sold
sexuality because it replicates oppressive stereotypes, and even as the optimists
encourage hip hop bombshells’ revolutionary use of sexuality to deconstruct the
same stereotypes, not one of these voices thinks “beyond the plantation,” back to
African histories, to look for alternative interpretive possibilities. Pough states
that “much has been written suggesting that Black women have a legacy of
resistance and an active presence in the public sphere that predates captivity and
enslavement in the United States. Therefore it predates the suffrage movement,
which usually marks the beginning of feminist activism in the United States.”331
Certainly, this is true: as discussed earlier in this chapter, women have been
resisting patriarchal domination and indeed operating outside of the patriarchal
context for thousands of years, across the globe. By examining the societies that
participated in this resistance and/or were founded according to egalitarian
paradigms, particularly pre-colonial African matriarchies, new possibilities for
hip hop feminism—indeed, anti-sexist praxis in its entirety—become manifest.
In the course “Queen B@# $H 101: Hip Hop Eshu,” taught at Syracuse
University by Professor Greg Thomas, our project was to do precisely this: locate
other histories and traditions by which to interpret the radical anti-sexist
language of the Notorious K.I.M., Lil’ Kim. One of the most profound sources
for our reinterpretation was found in Reinventing Africa: Matriarchy, Religion, and
Culture, a volume wherein Black Studies scholar Ifi Amadiume rediscovers and
rewrites the history of pre-colonial Africa. From the inception of “modern”
history—that is, racist, patriarchal, and imperialist Euro-American
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historicization—African history has been largely ignored, the only narratives
entering hegemonic historical accounts being those of ethnocentric
anthropologists and imperialists. Consequently, little is known about the diverse
cultures that have existed across the massive continent of African before it was
colonized and exploited by Western powers. As a result, reconstructing history is
complicated and at times unspecific; but through the survival of traditional oral
histories and with intense historical and ethnographic research, dedicated
scholars like Amadiume and Cheikh Anta Diop—the groundbreaking and
highly-acclaimed African scholar whose work is the premise of much of
Amadiume’s—have made amazing progress. Importantly, historical
reconstruction is necessary in the contemporary neocolonial context, as
knowledge is the key to reinterpreting the world and is thus necessary for
liberation.
Amadiume astutely critiques the dominant notion, theorized by
nineteenth century European historians and anthropologists, that patriarchy
represents the culmination of human civilization based on the fact that such a
formulation only applies to Indo-European history. While this conceptualization
proposes that society has evolved from sexually promiscuous barbarism, to
matrilineal systems, to matriarchy, and finally to monogamous, nuclear families
and patriarchy, Amadiume contends that such a progression is false.332 Rather,
the reality is that two vastly different systems—matriarchy and patriarchy—
existed simultaneously, rising from different “cradles” of civilization: matriarchy
was predominant in Africa (until European colonization) and patriarchy existed
across Europe, while the Mediterranean and Western Asia went through
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different stages and transitions by region.333 In short, anthropology has been
historically incorrect due to the ethnocentrism and racism of ethnographers and
historians. Unable to conceive of a successful social system that is not necessarily
predicated on male dominance, “European anthropologists were misled by their
own ethnocentrism into insisting on a general theory of male dominance.”334
Amadiume concludes that the presence of “certain falsehoods, which were and
are still taught by Europeans about Africa’s so-called primitiveness and
backwardness, can only now be understood as a calculated conspiracy to …
justify European racism, and its related imperialism and colonial expansion into
Africa.”335
There are three primary, definitional characteristics of matriarchal
societies that are important to this discussion: 1) women held economic power
and were autonomous from men, 2) matriarchy prioritized love and harmony
but had a vibrant history of resistance, and 3) matriarchal society was typified by
a dual-sex system. Because these societies were agriculturalist—a system wherein
man hunted and woman cultivated the crops—woman was “the keeper of the
house and the mistress of the food” and was therefore granted power “based on
her very important and central economic role.” That is, she was not simply
mother or housekeeper: she was in the central economic actor, controlling the
marketplace which was based on exchange, redistribution, and socialization
between kin groups and communities. 336 Furthermore, in African matriarchy
there were two autonomous but cooperative governments, a Women’s Council—
which ruled the marketplace—and a Men’s Council. These assemblies were
governed democratically, ruled by consensus, and were required to respect
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differing opinions; however, anyone who abused power was removed by their
own constituencies.337
Moreover, matriarchy was founded on goddess religion and a moral
system that “generated the concepts of love, harmony, peace, and cooperation,
and forbade human bloodshed, imposed a check on excessive and destructive
masculinism.”338 And yet, African matriarchy also has a powerful history of
resistance and revolt and against patriarchal domination by whatever means
necessary, evidenced as recently as 1929 with the Igbo Women’s War in which
women violently rebelled against British colonial forces. Amadiume explains that
women used every strategy available, “from peaceful demonstrations to mass
women’s walk-outs and exodus—even resorting to total war when all else
failed.” Since these tactics were seldom used and only in emergency situations,
demands were always met by their male counterparts and kin.339
Most importantly, African matriarchy is defined by a completely different
gender system than European and American patriarchy. In matriarchal systems,
there is a “dual-sex” system, meaning that each gender is autonomous, controls
its own issues, and can operate independently or have equal opportunities for
power. This in contrast to the Euro-American “single-sex” system wherein all
social power is invested in men, and women can only achieve power by
assimilating into the roles and political concerns of men.340 Moreover, there was
simultaneously a tremendous degree of gender fluidity. That is, gender was
considered malleable and subjective: males could be identified as women or
females could be identified as men, and there was even a neuter construct men
and women could adopt in order to “share roles and status.”341 Essentially,
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gender was understood as a transitory ideology that could be freely manipulated
and openly transgressed, independent to biology or anatomy. This is in stark
opposition to the narrow, limiting, binary sex-/gender categorizations that
Western society, to this day, has been unable to transcend.
As we discovered in “Queen B@# $H 101,” situating hip hop feminism
within this African matriarchal context presents the potential for a
reinterpretation black women’s multiple encounters with and reactions to
Western sexuality/womanhood, including those of controversial female emcees.
While hip hop feminists are not necessarily of African descent, hip hop—as a
cultural movement—most certainly is, as is fundamentally defined as such.
Therefore, any interpretation of hip hop culture does well to locate a foundation
in African histories and cultures. Specifically, an understanding of traditional
African women’s autonomy and economic power—a power predicated upon
mutualism and redistribution—provide grounds for reconsideration of the
accusation that high-maintenance, high-fashion rappers like Lil’ Kim are
shameless, commercialized consumers. While that may be the case for certain
segments of the rap industry, it is not necessarily the case all around: for instance,
we can understand Kim’s engagement in the economy as capitalist-age spin on
matriarchal traditions. In African matriarchal societies, economic participation
was part of socialization and economic power was a signifier of social
prominence, but the subsistence economy meant that all wealth was
redistributed into society.342 Similarly, Kim engages in entrepreneurial initiatives
and the designer fashion economy as a status symbol and as means of socializing
with her hip hop community—which often involves as certain degree of
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spectacle and materialism—but she redistributes a substantial amount of her
wealth into various charities.343 The capitalist system does not require her to
redistribute all of her wealth. Moreover, “trickin’” can be understood as an
engagement in exchange-based economy.
Furthermore, the tradition of resistance provides reinterpretation of
another notable aspect of female gangsta emcees such as Kim, but one which is
less frequently remarked upon than her sexuality: her violence. As femme as her
appearance and personality may seem, she’s a lyrical mobster, and is quite
familiar with street life. Declaring herself to be the “illest gansta alive,” her lyrics
contain frequent allusions to hits, stick ups, drive bys; an expansive vocabulary
of gun terminology; gang scenarios; and not a few violent threats to any who
would dare mess with her. However, Kim talks about acting out in order to
protest herself and her loved ones: “spread love: that’s what a real mob do! …
Keep it gangsta, look out for my people.”344 That is, she is not a violent predator
but a protective mother or sister—just like matriarchal mother warriors, who
engaged in rebellion and violence not to gain control, but to “defend and
maintain their autonomy” (emphasis added) from other groups that were trying
to dominate or mistreat them.345 Indeed, black women in the United States have a
long legacy of such powerful resistance; yet it is useful to further excavate those
traditions to long-buried roots.
Finally, consideration of matriarchal gender ideologies is essential to
understanding and redefining women’s sexuality in the context of Western
womanhood. Understanding that gender in matriarchal society was fluid and
malleable reveals that gender is not a fixed or biologically innate entity. Thus,
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women in general and black women in particular do not need the “culture of
dissemblance” and should not be expected to assimilate into the “cult of true
womanhood”: those are Western creations, as evidenced by the fact that
alternative gender conceptualizations existed in matriarchal social traditions.
That is, would African women in plantation America necessarily want entrance
to the “cult of true womanhood,” if granted the opportunity? The cult of true
womanhood is not implicitly appealing: rather, black women understandably
struggled to find a place within the cult for protection. If existing outside of
“womanhood” made them vulnerable to not only racist stereotypes but to brutal
rape, violence, and sexual assault by the white slaveholders who believed—
indeed, created—those stereotypes, assimilation would be a means of survival.
But in a context removed from racist and sexist violence, the “cult of true
womanhood” has little or no value for anyone except white bourgeois women
interested in maintaining class power and social status. Therefore, hypersexual
women rappers—as well as blues women—are refuting and resisting
containment in rigid Western gender conventions through their unadulterated
sexual expression.
Indeed, scholars of hip hop and Black studies are now taking this issue of
gender fluidity in hip hop women to the next level. In Prophets of the Hood, Imani
Perry notes that “many women [emcees] now visually look femme, but
simultaneously occupy male spaces linguistically.”346 That is, they switch back
and forth between female and male lyrical personas, at times conflating the two
or opting to occupy an entirely new space all together: they claim social and
sexual dominance, “[appropriate] males spaces,” and in the process become
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“badwomen”—a spin on the traditional male trickster figure of African
American folktales.347 To that extent, Black studies professor Greg Thomas notes
the ironic labeling of Lil’ Kim as a “bad woman” by the “puritanical moralists”
who recently convicted her of perjury, noting that such a label was “the highest
compliment paid her foremothers in Black folklore and the Blues.” Thomas
explains that Kim’s “whole system of rhymes radically redistributes power,
pleasure and privilege, always doing the unthinkable, embracing sexuality on
her kind of terms”—terms that are decidedly outside of Western ideological
conventions.348
Moreover, scholars are beginning to recontextualize hip hop in terms
other African cultural traditions. Since the beginning of the hip hop era, a
connection has been articulated between rap and hip hop beats to African drums
and African American verbal and spoken word traditions; between racial
solidarity, gangsta culture and Black nationalism; and to slang, jive talk, and
blues/black church call-and-response traditions. Pough, for instance, notes that
“all of these African American oral traditions, including rap, can be traced back
to West African oral traditions.”349
And now, connections are being traced between hip hop figures and
African orishas, or deities. Particularly, Greg Thomas is pioneering revolutionary
research into the identification between Eshu/Legba, the West African trickster
god/dess, and rappers—especially Lil’ Kim. This, indeed, was the context of
“Queen B@# $H 101: Hip Hop Eshu”: examining the ways Lil’ Kim literally
embodies the very characteristics central to characterizations of Eshu/Legaba,
one of the highest deities in Yoruba and West African religions, the dual-

131

gendered god/des of language and multilingualism. At a 2004 conference on
Diasporic African studies, Thomas elucidated the many premises for this
identification:
Both are identified as trickster figures … Both are identified as
divine messengers or linguists … Both are endlessly demonized as
‘devils’ by white racist empires of Christian colonialism: Both
represent some brand of poetic justice, standing outside statusquo understandings of ‘morality’ in the West, unexamined
notions of ‘good’ and ‘bad,’ or ‘good’ versus ‘evil.’ Both have been
identified as ‘hyper-sexual,’ or ultra-erotic, frequently in phallusfetishizing fashion.350
These are just a few of the ways hip hop artists, and Kim in particular, can be
identified and reinterpreted when located with a historically appropriate,
nonwestern context.
Thus, when hip hop feminists accuse hypersexual emcees of reaffirming
detrimental plantation stereotypes, of being sold-out, commercialized and
spiritless, or of being glamorized prostitutes, they are failing to properly
contextualize these women. And when they applaud these women for mere
“sexual agency,” they are failing to see beyond the tip of the iceberg: the genderfluidity and resistance to Western femininity go far beyond sexual confidence
and assertiveness. Indeed, many hip hop feminist issues can be interpreted and
potentially resolved if hip hop feminism scholar and writers listened more
attentively to the knowledge being created by anti-sexist hip hop artists. All
things considered, the fact remains that feminism—all feminisms—in America
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must divest of Western ideological confines in order to imagine more
possibilities for liberation, resistance, and ways to be—or not to be—a “woman.”
In the following section, I interrogate this divestment to a new end. How
are American feminists to become contextually self-conscious to the extent that
transnational feminism, the feminist impulse of the new millennium, can become
possible? That is, how can we learn to understand that notions of gender,
sexuality, and liberation are contextually dependant, vary from culture to culture,
and are relative to the ideological context in which they are encountered—so that
a multi-faceted international feminist coalition can operate in a manner which
represents the realities of all members?

Decentralizing Feminism and Crossing Borders:
Problematics and Possibilities for Transnationalism

Due to the implications of expanding globalization, transnationalism has become
an imperative for future feminist movement. As people and capital cross borders,
as the first world engages in neo-colonization of the third world, and as
technology brings us ever closer together at the same time as global economic
disparity drives us ever farther apart, the impetus falls on social justice
movements to look overseas: to connect with global brothers and sisters,
comrades and allies; and to confront, become accountable to, and then resist and
disengage from one’s complicity with systems of global domination and
institutionalized violence. And feminism is approaching the forefront of this
geopolitical shift, the discourse of transnational feminism yearly growing and
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expanding. As Labaton and Martin note in their afterword to The Fire This Time,
“Feminists are paying close attention to the ways in which power is manifested
differently now than it was thirty years ago and are developing appropriate new
frameworks for social justice work.”351
However, this transnational impulse is not without its difficulties. In fact,
it is intrinsically permeated with them, due to the imperialist legacy of Western
culture in general and white feminism in particular. As modern feminist
movement in the United States has overwhelmingly ignored issues of Western
imperialist domination, and has fostered an ethos of discord along class, race,
and age lines, often obscured are “issues of race, nation, and gender in
contemporary neocolonialism.”352 Because these important matters were absent
from Western feminist agendas until relatively recently, today it is difficult to
appropriately reform and revolutionize those agendas: so deeply ingrained and
normalized is the “neocolonial paternalism” that has hitherto characterized
relationships between first world feminists and third world women.353 Indeed,
bell hooks notes that while there is indeed a need for global women’s equality,
Western feminists need to reject imperialist fantasies in order to effectively
engage in global movement: for instance, we must reject the idea that “women in
the United States have more rights than any group of women globally, are ‘free’
if they want to be, and therefore have the right to lead feminist movement and
set feminist agendas for all the other women in the world, particularly women in
third world countries.354 In her words, we must adopt a “decolonized feminist
perspective” if we are to engage in international women’s issues without

134

sensationalizing the issue and declaring other cultures and nations to be
backwards and “less than” dominant Western cultures.355
One of the primary considerations to make when engaging in or
theorizing transnational feminist praxis is the politics of globalization and bordercrossing, or the navigation into and through various national, cultural, political,
economic, and geographical as well as cognitive and psychological territories. As
Chandra Mohanty explains, the theory of globalization is wholly invested in
borders—or rather, the absence/removal thereof. Globalization in the twentyfirst century is idealized as “an epoch of borderlessness” that allows mobility of
“technology (e.g., the internet), financial capital, environmental wastes, modes of
governance (e.g., the World Trade Organization), as well as cross-national
political movements (e.g., struggles against the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund).”356 However, as Saskia Sassen describes, implicit to this regime
of borderlessness is profound and worldwide inequality, for the regime
“strengthens the advantages of certain types of economic actors and weakens
those of others” in a way that increases concentrations of both wealth and
poverty.357 Basically, this kind of borderless society gives even more to the
privileged few and even less to the downtrodden masses. Sassen furthermore
notes that there is a unique set of circumstances within globalization that
welcomes the border-crossing of capital, but devalues or resists the bordercrossing of subordinate social actors—particularly third world working women.
In effect, border-crossing is “legitimate for capital [which] has indeed become
imbued with positive value by many government elites and their economic
advisors,” but act oppositely “when it comes to people, as is perhaps most
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sharply illustrated in the rise of anti-immigrant feeling and the renationalizing of
politics.”358 And as a result, border-crossing is politically contentious and
characteristically uneasy.
Indeed, these global cities frequently become cultural, linguistic, and
psychological borderlands—as Anzaldua has theorized them—due to the tension
between free-flowing global capital and the immigrant workforce, both of whom
are drawn across borders as the economy shifts to specific territories. Hence,
Sassen continues, in global cities there is “a new geography of centrality and
marginality”: metropolitan centers and global downtowns are highly invested in,
in terms of real estate and telecommunications, while the corresponding lowincome neighborhoods are barely subsisting; well-educated workers see their
incomes routinely inflating while less-skilled laborers’ incomes are routinely
downsized; and profits of financial businesses escalate while industry declines to
the sub-subsistence level.359 Ultimately, this geography represents what Sassen
calls a “new dynamics of inequality” according to which an entire milieu of
workers, work cultures, firms, and residencies “are never marked, recognized, or
represented as being a part of globalization processes. Nor are they valorized as
such.”360 Thus, this process of globalization is revisionist imperialism, a different
kind of plantation system. European and American corporations are investing in
third world lands, and making millions off of the underpaid, menial labor of
poor and working class third world bodies—particularly those of poor brown
and black women.
Accordingly, this neocolonialism has serious implications for feminist
studies: the “borderless” inequality of globalization begins to seem not simply
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coincidental, but intentionally aimed at disempowered women whose agency is
taken for granted and whose neediness is taken advantage of. Any effective
transnational feminism must take on this issue, which requires decolonizing
one’s consciousness and committing to revolutionary feminism: as hooks notes, a
reformist or “power feminist” aesthetic that considers only explicit women’s
issues—violence, veiling, education—cannot fully account for the comprehensive
realities of third world lives under imperialism.361
Another important consideration to make when considering transnational
feminist politics is how this large-scale “border-crossing” translates into issues of
“cultural explanation” in regard to matters defined as “third world women’s
issues.” Uma Narayan notes that with the increase of global migration, as well
as with “the growing transnational ‘exchange’ of feminist scholarship and
information, which seems connected … to increasing academic and pedagogic
efforts to ‘learn about Other cultures’ and women’s issues within them,”362
popular media and feminist studies alike have placed an emphasis on major
international women’s issues. In addition to the problems encountered when
feminist scholars begin debating the merits of universalism versus cultural
relativism, the kinds of issues that reach the Western popular consciousness are
extremely suspect. As Narayan points out, only certain types of women’s issues
ever cross the borders between East and West, and it seems as though
“ ‘Different,’ ‘Alien,’ and ‘Other’ cross these borders with considerable more
frequency than problems that seem ‘similar’” to Western feminist issues.363
The result is that issues like female genital cutting (FGC), veiling, and
dowry-murder permeate freely across global membranes while other issues—
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less sensationalized, less “different” issues—are “held up at the border.” Hence,
as Narayan articulates, “[i]t is difficult not to conclude that there is a premium on
‘Third World difference’ that results in greater interest being accorded to those
issues that seem strikingly ‘different.’” 364 However, when national context is
considered, many of these sensationalized issues are not so different from
Western feminist issues. Narayan uses dowry-murder as an example of a third
world issue that has a major propensity toward border-crossing in her analysis of
how “contextual information” is generally withheld when sensationalized issues
gravitate across borders. “In traveling across national borders unaccompanied
by such contextual information,” she explains, “‘dowry-murder’ loses its link to
the category of ‘domestic violence’ and becomes transmuted into some bizarre
‘Indian ritual,’” a phenomenon Narayan terms “death by culture.”365,366
Evidently, there is an entire set of factors that problematize possibilities
for feminist transnationalism. Scholar Eliza Noh intensely and thoughtfully
interrogates these issues in her article, “Problematics of Transnational Feminism
for Asian-American Women,” focusing particularly on how tenets of
postmodernism perpetrate many reductions and erasures in transnational
relationships between first world feminists and third world women. She explains,
“Just as Marxist and modernist frameworks clearly were never sufficient to
account for the colonial predicament outside of their own worldviews,
postmodernist trends in transnational discourse also tend to spring from
specifically Eurocentric perspectives.”367 She claims that phrases such as
“transnationalism” are “semantic smokescreens” that obscure the important
realities of coloniality and neocoloniality, in that transnationalism by definition
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implies that state sovereignties have been obliterated by the transmission of
global economies and cultures across borders, and by definition stands in
opposition to nationalist movements for autonomous sovereignty.368
Accordingly, Noh notes that a feminism that identifies as transnational is
necessarily suspect. She poses the questions, “Is this not yet another instance of
the unmarked, international Woman of imperial feminism? Does the feminist
rejection of nationalism come precisely from the movement’s uneasy dealings
with race and culture…?”369 That is, if feminists seek a transnational approach
meaning that they seek to deconstruct national divisions and boundaries, does
that mean they are imperialistically assuming the privilege to conduct such a
deconstruction? Does the transnationalist opposition to nationalism reflect white
women’s desire to render the potential threats of race, class, and autonomous
third world nations obsolete? While she acknowledges that some feminist
antipathy toward nationalist movement is likely a response to the patriarchal
dominance and marginalization of women that frequently characterizes
nationalist movement, Noh nonetheless contends that feminism needs to leave
room for anticolonial resistance: autonomy is part of liberation, after all.
“Moreover,” she explains, “such an approach ignores the uses of feminist
nationalism by women-of-color revolutionaries, which suggests that an uncritical
dismissal of nationalism derives from a unitary conception of nationhood from a
Eurocentric, modernist perspective.”370 That is, insofar as nationalism is
dismissed from feminist possibility and convention, woman of color histories
and traditions are excluded—which assumes an exclusively Western feminist
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context and necessarily precludes possibilities for actual, egalitarian international
coalition.
Noh furthermore takes issue with the fact that much transnationalist
rhetoric has displaced feminist critiques by black women and women of color
which argued the existence of a “racialized sex.”371 That is, while black, brown,
Latina, Chicana, Asian, and Native American women have been arguing for at
least the last thirty years that axes of domination cannot be ranked, transnational
feminism organizes around the common axis of gender, locating that as the
central source of difference worldwide and understanding other differences as
“merely additive or cumulative.”372 To engage in transnationalism, explains Noh,
third world women are expected to downplay their experiences of racism and
colonialism and “prioritize” gender oppression and resistance. Thus, this
structure ignores considerations of race and colonialism, and indeed often
formulates race and culture as “a ‘play’ of ‘difference’” that is socially
constructed and therefore negligible—even as gender is considered universal
and remains uninterrogated. 373 This structure therefore represents another
situation in which Western women are defining the praxis from their own
isolated subjectivities, neglecting to consider other worldviews and experiential
contexts.
~

*

~

Ultimately, then, transnationalist discourse is predicated upon the notion
of transcending national borders, race, and colonial realities. Yet, this is
problematic because different women perform different feminisms, and may
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disagree over various issues—and as Noh comments, “I assume those ruptures
cannot (nor should they) be easily transcended for the sake of ‘sisterhood.’”374
Is it possible, therefore, to construct a transnational “feminist alliance” based on
“coalition” or “affiliation”? Noh doubts that affiliation can operate appropriately
in this context, since it connotes reductive sameness, but she advocates that
development of connection across difference based on Elaine Kim’s idea of
affinities which “can be used to describe the aspect of identification or recognition
that is not only consciously constructed, but also unconscious and ‘visceral’ …
Affinities are subjective, even cosmic attractions or kinship constructed through a
shared, albeit embattled, political and cultural history.”
But in order to do this, to create such affinities, we must rehistoricize
feminist history, rewrite feminist agendas to reflect the cross-national issues with
which black, brown, Latina, Chicana, Asian and Native American women and
feminist have long been concerned. 375 If the feminist movement is to be viable,
and indeed become expanded and enlivened for the new millennium—prepared
for non-oppressive and non-reductive transnationalism, committed to
neocolonial resistance, and intent on holistic principles of liberation and social
justice—Western feminism must divest of its contextual tunnel vision, resist
(neo)colonialism and imperialism, and learn to identify, resist, and then look
beyond purely Western conventions. As global citizens become ever closer to one
another, it is vital that we work toward a truly cooperative movement; as we
forge identifications between neighbors near and far, it is vital that we learn to
coalesce in ways that are true to all of our visions, realities, and desires, that we
respect difference and separation as necessary, and that we learn to understand
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our own positionalities and subjectivities as relative to shifting axes of identities,
cultural contexts, and historical moments.
More than anything, this process involves a re-writing of history so that
there is more possibility, fuller legacies from which to draw our theories,
identities, and praxis. And in order to catalyze this total transformation, we must
begin with undoing and resisting racist and imperialist legacies. This is not to say
that feminism should be abandoned: but we should take care to valorize the most
visionary and revolutionary feminist legacies, expand our notions of what
constitutes “feminism,” and create a consciousness as the global context of antisexist language, theory, and praxis. And we should always maintain awareness
of hegemonic feminism’s shortcomings, its erasures, its violent perpetration of
reduction and domination.
An inextricable component of this historical re-vision involves
feminists—young and old—refusing to adopt globally isolating and contextually
limiting rhetoric like a “wave” identity. To call a group or generation of feminists
a “wave” implicitly locates that group in a specific national and historical context;
and creates associations between that “wave” and previous “waves,” despite the
differences that may exist and in disregard of the flaws of earlier “waves.” The
use of the wave construct in Western feminist history isolates Western feminists
from the rest of the world, or alternately, imperialistically imposes the singular
vision of Western feminism onto cultures and nations worldwide. Therefore,
because “wave” rhetoric locates a single, limited, and certainly flawed history,
and hence impedes transnational affinity, any “wave” designation or
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identification has no place within a truly visionary, fully revolutionary feminist
movement.
~CONCLUSION~

‘Be a Crossroads’376 :
Constructing a Culture of Consciousness and Continuing the Feminist
(Re)Vision

“Now that we’ve begun to break the silence
and begun to break through the diabolically erected barriers
and can hear each other and see each other, we can sit down with
trust and break bread together. Rise up and break our chains as well.”
–Toni Cade Bambara377

The movement that has defined itself as the “third wave” of United States
feminism consists of many gifted writers, progressive thinkers, promising
scholars, and passionate activists. Adherents of the “third wave” have exhibited
tremendous potential through the feminist literature, art, music, and activist
work they have produced in the last decade. And they have founded impressive
activist organizations, demonstrating their commitment and leadership
capabilities—all in the face of a mainstream media and United States feminist
establishment that frequently accuse their entire age group of apathy and lack of
political impulse.
However, despite the considerable potential these feminists possess,
designating the movement as the “third wave” creates irrevocable flaws and
necessarily interrupts feminist goals, interferes with the alleged ideals of the
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“third wave,” and is ultimately self-defeating. By adopting a label that
automatically places it in opposition to and competition with other feminist
generations, the third wave eclipses important analyses of race, class, nation, and
culture. By focusing so exclusively on disidentification with “second wave”
feminist “mothers,” the third wave obscures the powerful visionary voices of the
women who most significantly inform “third wave” ideology and praxis. And by
implicitly claiming a specifically Western historical legacy, the third wave
replicates an imperialistic subjectivity, becomes isolated in Western conventions,
is unable to imagine feminist possibility outside of Western normalized
notions—and therefore precludes possibility for meaningful transnationalism.
Taken together, the result of continuing the United States feminist wave
construct through a “third wave” identification is the perpetuation of imperialist,
racist, and reductive feminist historicizing. Dismantling of the “third wave”
identification is thus necessitated.
This argument does not intend to place blame on or holistically ridicule
the “third wave” for creating problematic historicization. Indeed, young/”third
wave” feminists are not necessarily or singularly at fault in this situation, for in
adopting a “wave” identity they were simply continuing /participating in the
Western feminist dialogue most mainstream U.S. feminists were taught. To be
sure, the wave construct and the problematic historicization it implicates extend
back for at least one hundred and fifty years. Rather, my point in addressing and
critiquing the third wave has been to deconstruct the ways a “third wave”
construct currently contributes to and perpetuates the problems that have always
marred Western feminism, Western feminist historicization—and indeed,
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Western historicization as a whole. Accordingly, I urge young feminists to resist a
“third wave”—or any “wave”—identification in order to interrupt that
problematic narrative and rehistoricize feminism.
For feminism to be enlivened for the new millennium, young feminists
must be brave enough to differentiate themselves from their predecessors, yet
not hesitate to forge solid dialogue and successful rapport across generations.
Feminists must take it upon themselves to learn a complete feminist history; we
must re-imagine feminism to go beyond narrow understandings of the “first”
and “second wave.” We must include in our narrative of contemporary and
historical feminism/anti-sexist practice U.S. third world and international
feminisms; we must imbue ourselves with the anti-racist, revolutionary
consciousness of progressive and Black, U.S. third world, and woman of color
feminists; and make a point to challenge our cultural knowledge, our
expectations, our preconceived notions and engage in international feminist
dialogue according to different terms.
In order to rehistoricize feminism and thereby create transnational
feminist affiliations (as Noh prescribed), Western feminism must understand that
there are various languages and practices of feminism and anti-sexism which
exist and have existed across the global for ages. It must adopt a broader
conception of feminism, a conception M. Jacqui Alexander and Chandra T.
Mohanty define as a “comparative, relational, and historically based conception
of feminism, one that differs markedly from the liberal-pluralist understanding
of feminism.”378 That is, simple tolerance, recognition, and acceptance of
international feminisms is not enough. Rather, Western feminism must
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understand itself as one part of the feminist narrative—not the leaders or
founders—and genuinely valorize anti-sexist practice and movement as it exists
indigenously across the globe. Such valorization is required for viable millennial
feminism, in order to create a framework that operates in opposition to systems
of global oppressions: sexism, racism, heterosexism and homophobia,
classism/capitalism, imperialism, and (neo)colonialism. This global resistance is
what Alexander and Mohanty describe as a “comparative, relational feminist
praxis that is transnational in its response to and engagement with global
processes of domination.”379
Accordingly, this kind of holistic resistance and dedication to liberation
mandates a new kind of transnational organizing. It requires that United States
feminism de-centers its own perspective, and de-centers gender oppression as
the “transhistorical” primary axis of international feminist identification/
coalition; and it requires that all feminists and feminist allies learn new ways of
mobilizing across national and cultural borders.380 Indeed, contemporary
feminists have begun theorizing about ways in which to enact such mobilization.
Chandra T. Mohanty, for instance, has suggested the concept of “feminism
without borders”: an “expansive and inclusive vision of feminism [that] need[s]
to be attentive to borders while learning to transcend them.”381 This notion does
not mean borderless feminism, but rather it intends to work across borders,
necessarily informed by them, understanding and respecting the national,
cultural, sexual, religious, linguistic, and personal borders while simultaneously
creating affiliations across them. As Mohanty describes it:
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[f]eminism without borders … acknowledges the fault lines,
conflicts, differences, fears, and containment that borders
represent. It acknowledges that there is no one sense of border,
that the lines between and through nations, classes, sexualities,
religions, and disabilities, are real—and that a feminism without
borders must envision change and social justice work across these
lines of demarcation and division.382
We need, in short, new ways of imagining and organizing feminism. One
such way is to relearn and internalize the differential consciousness of Black, U.S.
third world, and woman of color feminists if we are to contribute to—rather than
imperialistically structure and define—a transnational feminist/liberationist
conversation. According to Chela Sandoval, “Differential consciousness is the
expression of the new subject position … [which] permits functioning within, yet
beyond, the demands of dominant ideology.”383 It is the form of oppositional
consciousness practiced during the seventies and eighties by the revolutionary
Black, U.S. third world, and woman of color feminists who were active across a
wide range of social justice movements. Sandoval explains that, whereas
hegemonic feminist discourse was divided into competing ideological forms that
worked in opposition to one another and ultimately created irreconcilable
divisions within feminism, differential consciousness interpreted each form as
one possible expression of social resistance and liberationist consciousness.384
Mainstream feminist theorizing divides feminism into four evolutionary
phases, each of which made specific, different claims and accordingly suggested
different agendas toward liberation: liberal, Marxist, radical or cultural, and
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socialist/anti-racist.385 In dominant discourse, these forms of feminist
consciousness were assumed to be “fundamentally incompatible;”386 yet
Sandoval explains that once examined within a U.S. third world feminist context,
they are actually no more than alternate methods of expression. Narrow
compartmentalization that suggest each expression is mutually exclusive limits
feminist possibility: “What must be remembered is that each position in this
typology is an imaginary space that, when understood and enacted as if selfcontained and oppositional to one another, rigidly circumscribes what is possible
for social activists who want to work across their boundaries.”387
Indeed, U.S. third world feminists reworked and re-imagined these
categories, developing a new typology that neither circumscribed transition
between categories nor limited the typology to feminist movement alone: they
explicitly expanded the categories to include not only social movement in
resistance to gender domination but to race, sex, national, economic, cultural,
and social hierarchies, so that the entire typology “comprises a history of
oppositional consciousness.”388 Specifically, they added a fifth form of
consciousness to the typology created by academic feminists: the differential
form of consciousness and social movement, which emerged from “between and
among” the other four forms.389 That is, in the seventies, Black, U.S. third world,
and woman of color feminists frequently moved from traditional form to form,
changing groups, tactics, and mentalities as necessary in order to appropriately
respond to whatever was the issue at hand. Yet, no one analyzed the significance
of the mobility. The differential form, then, is a coalescence of the other four
forms which uses and moderates each individual form as needed, in order to
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create an ideological typography that is not hierarchical nor historically
sequential: each is recognized as a potential mode of consciousness.390
Therefore, the development of a differential consciousness—in that it
allows combinations, transitions, and overlapping of ideological forms that were
previously considered oppositional—is conducive to differential contexts,
various feminist constructs, and multiple articulations of feminism. As Sandoval
explains,
The application of differential consciousness generates grounds
for making coalitions with decolonizing movements for
emancipation in global affinities and associations. It retroactively
provides a structure, a theory, and a method for reading and
constructing identity, aesthetics, and coalition politics that are
vital to a decolonizing … politics and aesthetics.391
This differential consciousness provides, in other words, the potential for
feminists to form coalitions predicated upon affinity, as Noh advocated, so as to
make egalitarian transnational feminism viable and attainable.
A total vision: this is what is necessary for feminism to be enlivened, to be
effective. It is not a new idea; Black, U.S. third world, and woman of color
feminist theorists and activists have known this for decades. Yet, as a result of
the failures of hegemonic and academic feminist historicization, that knowledge
has been all but lost to the mainstream feminist narrative. Where and when this
knowledge surfaces in the mainstream, it is assimilated, frequently uncredited,
and in many ways exploited for the benefit of “progressive” sects seeking mass
approval or unique identification. This is not enough. Feminist narratives in the
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West must be rewritten, feminism re-imagined as our revolutionary predecessors
illustrated.
When I look at mainstream feminism, I am too frequently frustrated, and
dismayed at what my identity—as a white, heterosexual, college-educated
feminist from a working/middle class background—associates me with: I want
to say, I am not that kind of feminist. When I look at the feminism of many of my
peers, I want to ask for more: more historical location, more intense analyses of
international systems of oppression, more ideological location in the truly
revolutionary traditions of visionary feminists. When I read contemporary
feminist literature, the lack of a visionary impulse, and the erasure of
revolutionary Black and woman of color feminist praxis, is tangible. I know
feminism has a richer and more vital history than there seems to be on the
surface of popular rhetoric. People are, and have been, doing the important work
for ages. It’s time—past time—for this history to be positioned at the forefront of
feminist narratives, for international affiliations to be explored, and for global
anti-sexist praxis to be re-imagined in the new millennium.

“Think what may seem unthinkable and envision revolution.
Think sin fronteras—without borders”
-Betita Martinez392
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